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CHAPTER 1  
 INTRODUCTION 
 
In every moment of our lives we find ourselves somewhere; from the moment of birth to 
the last breath we find ourselves continuously located in space. We awake in space, sleep in 
space, and dream in space. Hence, any philosophical investigation of a human being necessarily 
involves a discussion on the problematic of space. It is impossible to conceive of the human 
being or of the human experience apart from the bounds of space.  
This honors thesis will explore the problematic of spatiality as addressed by three 
continental thinkers of the last century: Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jan 
Patočka. For each of these thinkers spatiality is not the principle theme of investigation but a 
meaningful account of spatiality arises through their philosophical accounts of lived human 
experience.  
The original question that guided me to explore the concept of spatiality was movement. 
When I started exploring the concept of movement, however, I was constantly faced with 
presupposition of space. All movement occurs in and is made possible by more primary 
occurrences of spatiality and orientation in the world. Thus clearly space, as the condition for 
movement, was a more crucial topic for me to explore if in the future I were to further 
investigate the problematic of movement. Throughout this analysis I will try to show that space 
is not only the condition for movement but for subjectivity’s interaction, engagement, and 
livelihood with the world in general. To not fully account for subjectivity’s spatiality would be to 
pass over subjectivity’s most essential characteristics and functions.  
  6 
  What I am primarily interested in is the distinction between physical space and lived 
space; more simply put, the former is a pure theorization space while the latter is an experiential 
account of space. The notion of physical space determines spatial values primarily as that which 
can be measured. The notion of physical space is found in the natural science but can be seen as 
stemming from early modern philosopher as well. For instance, in the modern philosophy of 
Rene Descartes, the concept of spatiality is defined by substantiality, characterized by extension. 
The Cartesian notion of space, as the extension of substance, accounts only for a particular type 
of spatiality, namely an objective spatiality, which provides an exhaustive account of spatiality 
only for a world full of pure substance. The concept of spatiality as it is thematized within 
phenomenology, however, lies in critical contrast to conceptions of space presented by early 
modern philosophers. Humans do not merely exist as objects in space; rather, there is a constant 
interactive inhabiting of space, which is at the crux of human spatiality. The problematic of 
spatiality is not a matter of merely existing in space; rather, it is a question of relating to space 
through a sense of spatiality of the world and the body’s position in the world. Moreover, lived 
space is able to grasp other entities in the world while still retaining their existential meaning 
whereas physical space would reduce these entities to mere substance.  As Jan Patočka, in his 
text Body, Community, Language, World, so eloquently puts it: 
There is a fundamental difference between being in space as a part of it, alongside 
other things, and living spatially, being aware of being in space, of living in 
space…A merely corporeal being can exist in space, can relate to space, 
nonetheless the lived spatiality of our body cannot consist in objectively 
geometric relations as thing.
1
 
The understanding of spatiality as a geometric relation doesn’t suffice because as Patočka is 
suggesting, we are not merely substantive bodies that live in an indifferent state to our world. 
                                                          
1 (BCLW, 31) 
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Rather we are embodied beings that are aware of our spatiality and can relate to it. By addressing 
spatiality only on the basis of extended substance, it is precisely this awareness and relation to 
our own spatiality that is lost.  
Thus, this Honors Thesis will focus on the concepts of spatiality and orientation of the 
worldly human being. Through this analysis I hope to draw insights into the way we spatially 
understand our bodies, our environment, and the tasks we involve ourselves in. An understanding 
of spatiality and orientation may also grant a richer understanding of the fundamental differences 
between lived space and physical space. Space is no longer a plane of determinate points; rather, 
it is experienced as a relationship between subjectivity and the world. In other words, 
experiential space occurs not on the basis of absolute terms of direction but rather through a 
process of subjectivity’s organic interaction with the world.  
To elucidate these central concerns of this Thesis lets take an everyday situation as 
example. You are at a café having coffee with your closest friend. There are all sorts of 
commotion on the busy street surrounding you two, but you both are leaned slightly in towards 
each other listening in earnest as to not miss a single word. In that moment there are numerous 
things that are in your proximal environment. Measurably, you could say what is closest to you 
and what is farthest; your elbows are on the coffee table or your hand in on the coffee cup are 
what is most near and the bus turning the corner at the end the street is farthest from you. In our 
lived experience of this environment, however, measurement of distance is not so much the 
ultimatum on closeness and farness. Your friend in the conversation may seem the closest thing 
to you because your attention or concern is directed towards her. The table, which your elbows 
are touching, seems to magically recede into the farness. The beauty of lived spatiality though is 
that this awareness is shot through in our experience in a constant and ever changing way…Soon 
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the coffee spills off the table and the spilled coffee is much closer than your friend across the 
table. Then the bus at the corner makes a loud screech and no longer does it seem at such a 
distance. Our experience of the world is always shifting and re-orienting in accordance with the 
meaningful situations we find ourselves in; this is precisely the basis of lived spatiality. This 
Thesis seeks to understand these structures of nearness and farness in space, as well as 
orientation and directionality of our environment, and how they are phenomenologically 
constituted. 
As lived spatiality is the concept I wish to elucidate, phenomenology will be the method 
used in this investigation. Phenomenology is the study of structures of experience of 
consciousness from the first person perspective. A central tenant in phenomenology is the notion 
of intentionality; consciousness is always consciousness of something. Consciousness is always a 
relation between an act of consciousness and an object of consciousness. Phenomenology as a 
methodology has the ability to take any experience and unfold the structure of consciousness 
within that experience; we can think here of anything form the experience of reading to having a 
conversation. The account phenomenology provides us with is that of experience from within the 
world and from within the self, rather than by means of abstracting into the objective. In this 
Thesis, what we are after is not an objective understanding of space, but rather space as we 
experience it in our daily lives. In an age that readily relies on science for the explanation of 
phenomena, phenomenology offers an alternative way of understanding experience; one that 
takes into account subjectivity and the world as it is given to subjectivity, rather than through a 
worldview that has been sterilized by the scientific method. Through phenomenology we will be 
able to understand the phenomenon of space as a lived experience.  
  9 
This work will be broken into three chapters: 1) Spatiality of Dasein in Heidegger’s 
Being and Time, 2) Spatiality of the Body-Subject in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Perception, and 3) The Concept of Spatiality in the Writings of Jan Patočka.  
We begin with Heidegger, because it is arguably due to Heidegger’s analysis of Being 
that my analysis of space can take place. In Being and Time, Heidegger investigates the question 
of Being, which within the history of philosophy has been taken to be self-evident or indefinable. 
Heidegger doesn’t try to understand different entities or beings but rather just the predicate of 
Being itself. In other words, he is concerned with what it means to be. Heidegger continues then 
to conduct a fundamental ontology of Being itself and most complexly draws an analytic of 
Dasein [Being-There]. Dasein is uniquely characterized as reflective and reflexive; it is able to 
relate to itself and takes issue with its existence. In turn, it has the potential to project concern 
into the world of entities, shaping its experience of them. Dasein is also a spatial Being through 
and through, it is always found in the world. Dasein isn’t in the world like water is in a cup; 
Dasein inhabits the world as it has the ability to interact and relate to it. As will be explicated, 
Dasein’s inhabiting of the world and its unique concern for its own existence are essential to 
understanding the spatiality of Dasein for it is through Dasein’s own projection onto its world 
that nearness and farness are constituted.  
However, as we will see, Heidegger’s analysis hardly touches on the embodied nature of 
Dasein; rather, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is concerned with the existential state of 
Dasein’s Being. Thus, the second chapter moves to Merleau-Ponty’s corporeal spatiality. 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is driven by a desire to return to a pre-objective world; a world prior 
to theorization of it, one that belongs to experience itself. The pre-objective world can only be 
accessed by the body; thus enters the problematic of the body. The body for Merleau-Ponty is 
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not an object, but rather it is a lived body. In his seminal work, Phenomenology of Perception, all 
notions of mind-body dualism are left behind as the human is conceived of as the body-subject: a 
pure unity of subjectivity and physicality. Hence there is a shift from Being inhabiting the world 
to a corporeal being in the world, though one with the same potential for care and interaction 
with its world. In the chapter on Merleau-Ponty we will see not only a spatial understanding of 
the body but of the body’s orientation to the world. What is brought clear in Merleau-Ponty’s 
writings is how orientation within a place is not determined by absolute directions; rather is it 
determined by a familiarity of the body to its location as inhabitable. The body seeks an 
orientation in which it can execute the tasks towards which it is aimed. For example, if I am 
faced with an image of an upside down kitchen, I orient myself, my body, within the picture 
according to how I would find myself using the kitchen towards my tasks. Thus, for Merleau-
Ponty spatiality and orientation are concepts inseparable from embodiment. This phenomenon is 
the same as when you lay your head to the side; the world doesn’t rotate to the side as well, 
rather we still maintain a sense of orientation as if we were standing up.   
The third chapter presents the same themes in the writings of Jan Patočka. For Patočka 
the subject-body gains its orientation with respect to the tasks towards which it is aimed. For 
example, we lean towards the lecturer who is speaking or hunch over the table as we enjoy a 
good meal. For Patočka humans are guided by a dynamism from which they project their tasks; 
our bodies are the axis of this energy. The body becomes point zero from which our orientation 
projects out. With our bodies as point zero, it is also the body that is often missing in our 
orientation. We are rarely aware of our bodies, but rather towards something to which we aim.  
I chose Patočka’s writings for the third chapter because of his philosophy regarding the 
movements of life. Spatiality in the context of Patočka’s movements shows most clearly the 
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importance of the topic of spatiality as it asserts orientation as the most primordial event for man; 
with sinking off roots into the earth, man first gets a sense of location. Patočka’s final movement 
of true self-understanding and liberation must always be on the basis of the primordial sinking of 
roots and self-localization. The notion that orientation is the most rudimentary experience of man 
upon which life is built up from shows the importance of gaining an understanding of spatiality 
and orientation. 
Lastly, in the conclusion I will provide a brief synopsis of the analysis undertaken in 
order to succinctly lay out the ways in which lived spatiality has been conceived of in Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, and Patočka. I will also return to my original question on movement to briefly 
draw implications of how movement can aid us in a bodily understanding of our spatiality.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 SPATIALITY IN HEIDEGGER’S BEING AND TIME 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From an initial glance at the title ‘Being and Time’, one can ascertain that the main 
themes under discussion for Martin Heidegger in his magnum opus is that of ‘being’ and its 
temporality, or rather the temporal framework in which Being finds itself grounded. In fact, for 
Heidegger, temporality serves “as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of 
Being”.2 Despite the prioritization of temporality within the text, another important theme does 
arise within Heidegger’s ontology of Being: spatiality. While not the main issue in Being and 
Time, spatiality plays a crucial role in the understanding of Being because, as we will see, Being 
is itself spatial in a number of different ways and in this sense inseparable from the issue of 
spatiality in the same way as it is from temporality. In turn, fully understanding the spatiality of 
Being reveals fundamental characteristics of Being in its world. But what exactly does it mean to 
say that Being is spatial? First, when thinking of spatiality one tends to think of a notion of space 
dealing with measureable distance; the spatial distance of an object to other objects determines 
its spatiality. Secondly, to say that Being is spatial also implies that Being is somewhere; we 
understand this somewhere to be space, in particular the space of the world. One often thinks, 
however, of being in the space of the world by means of extension through space.  
In Being and Time, however, one finds a radical reevaluation of the historical conception 
of space, particularly of Descartes’ geometric and objective space, which leads to the 
aforementioned assumptions regarding space. Descartes’ notion of spatiality has been 
                                                          
2
 (BT, 1) 
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characterized primarily in terms of extension; that which is a physical substance in the world is 
an extended one. The notions of extension and substance fail to grasp, however, the existential 
state of Being of the substance in question; substance as extension then becomes a sufficient 
understanding of Being though in fact it conceals the very essence of Being. In Being and Time, 
Heidegger’s investigation aims to recover the essence of Being, and in turn is tied to a new 
understanding of spatiality, which captures the existential characteristics of spatiality. The aim of 
this chapter is to uncover and bring forth the theme of spatiality in Being and Time and in doing 
so, better understand Being as well. In what follows, I will first offer a description of 
Heidegger’s general project and the notions of Being found within the text. Afterwards, I will 
turn to an analysis of Heidegger’s critique of Descartes and why spatiality is not reducible to 
extension. Lastly, I will bring the analysis spatiality in Heidegger’s Being and Time to 
completion by turning to Heidegger’s concept of the world in order to understand in what sense 
Being can be characterized as spatial. 
II. HEIDEGGER’S ONTOLOGY OF BEING: AN ANALYTIC OF DASEIN   
The ultimate aim of Being and Time is to create a fundamental ontology of Being within 
its temporal framework. ‘Being’ can be an elusive term, so what exactly is an inquiry into 
‘Being’ searching for? While ‘Being’, as a theme of philosophical inquiry, has been present since 
the time of Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger suggests that the theme has become less of explicit 
philosophical interest overtime. The theme of Being is one that everyone assumes to be 
understood or taken to be self-evident but in fact has been left unthematized. As Heidegger says, 
“we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being…But this vague understanding 
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of Being is still a fact.”3 After all, Being is a theme found in the ontology of any other theme we 
would study as is evident by the fact that a presupposition of Being is at the core of almost any 
statement we make; for example, “This chair is comfortable” “I am unhappy”. This fundamental 
ambiguity is not merely a vagueness of semantics but rather a true presupposition of the modality 
of existence of any such entity. All ontology presupposes the meaning of Being and in this case, 
all ontology leaves corners of its inquiry in shadowy darkness until the concept of ‘Being’ itself 
can be thematized.  
Then in what manner should Being be thematized? Being is not to be understood as the 
way in which we discover entities nor is Being reducible to an entity itself: 
The being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity. If we are to understand the problem 
of being, our first philosophical step consists…in not ‘telling a story’ – that is to 
say not defining entities by tracing them back in their origin to some other 
entities, as if being had the character of some possible entity 
4
  
We do not want to approach Being by looking at entities within the world in hopes of capturing 
Being as an entity itself. Being cannot be discovered through entities because Being itself is not 
an entity, nor does it hold properties of one. We do understand beings ontically as entities and we 
understand these entities by understanding their properties and characteristics. For example, I 
understand the entity of a chair as typically having the properties of four legs, a seat, and a back. 
Thus, when I see something with four legs, a seat, and back I understand it to be a chair. 
However, beings, as entities defined by their properties and characteristics are not the theme of 
Heidegger’s work. Rather, Being, as a mode of existence, is what is sought after in Heidegger’s 
investigation.  The chair, for example, has a mode of Being, which is not equivocal to its 
                                                          
3 (BT, 25) 
4
 (BT, 26) 
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properties of chair-ness (i.e. its four legs, seat, and back). Heidegger addresses three modes of 
Being, which must be explicated in further detail prior to turning to the issue of spatiality.  
Firstly, Heidegger is concerned with one particular type of Being: Being-There [Da-
Sein]. Dasein is essentially characterized self-relation; it has the ability to relate itself to itself. 
Dasein is arguably the Being that is at the center of Heidegger’s ontology as the two other modes 
of Being, ready-to-hand and present-at-hand are modes of being which are contingent upon 
Dasein’s understanding of them. Furthermore, the concept of spatiality in Being and Time is 
expanded upon with Dasein at its core. In the opening paragraph of §9, Heidegger reveals the 
fundamental characteristics of Dasein: 
We are ourselves the entities to be analyzed. The being of any such entity is in 
each case mine. These entities, in their being, comport themselves towards their 
being. As entities with such being, they are delivered over to their own being. 
Being is that which is an issue for every such entity.
5
 
From this one paragraph we can understand three key traits of Dasein. Firstly, Dasein is the 
mode of being which is characteristic of the human being. Heidegger begins his statement “we 
are ourselves…” to elucidate this point. Secondly, Dasein comports itself towards its own being. 
This claim points to the reflexive character of Dasein. Dasein has the ability to relate itself to 
itself; meaning that Dasein has a self-awareness of its own existence. So, unlike a chair, that has 
no awareness of its own existence, Dasein can relate to itself and through this reflexivity, give 
rise to a realization of its own mode of Being. We also learn that through this self-awareness, 
Dasein exists not only reflexively but also that Dasein cares about its own Being, its own Being 
is at ‘issue’ for Dasein. A chair on the other hand does not have the ability to even be indifferent 
to its existence, as it remain wholly unaware of its Being. The characteristic of Care is distinctive 
to Dasein and fundamentally sets it apart from other modes of Being. ‘Care’ [Sorge] is not to be 
                                                          
5
 (BT, 68) 
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understood as an emotional state rather, it is an existential character of Dasein’s Being.  Our lives 
matter to us and we are who we are in so far as we project this existential Care towards our 
world. Furthermore, Care is projected as concern towards other entities in the world or as 
solicitude towards other Dasein. Through Care, Dasein can relate not only to itself, but also to 
those entities in its world. A chair, on the other hand, cannot relate itself in any way to the desk 
next to it, but through concern, Dasein has the capability to relate to both of those entities in 
terms of how they are an issue for Dasein’s own Being. Through this capacity of relation and 
reflection, we can understand Dasein as its own possibility. As Heidegger says, “it can, in its 
very Being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself… 6 This 
possibility of my own life relates me in a distinct way to my life that other entities cannot relate 
in that I am consumed in an inescapable awareness of my own existence.   
In regards to the effort of this Thesis, one major characteristic of Dasein remains to be 
clarified: Dasein itself is spatial through and through and in this regard it is inseparable from 
spatiality. Prior to introducing the problematic of temporality Heidegger makes clear that Dasein 
always exists spatially. Heidegger says, “Dasein itself has a ‘being-in-space of its own but this in 
turn is possible only on the basis of being-in-the-world in general.”7 With this important claim 
two key insights are made evident; first, that Dasein has an intrinsic spatial characteristic that is 
unique to Dasein alone and second, that this unique spatiality has a worldly character. In other 
words, Dasein’s spatiality is constituted on the basis of Dasein as being-in-the-world. Therefore 
in order to understand the spatiality of Dasein, we must start first by clarifying the concept of the 
‘world’ and more specifically, Dasein’s  being-in-the-world. 
                                                          
6
 (BT, 68) 
7
 (BT, 68) 
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Prior to turning to the problematic of the world, I want to take a brief detour to indicate 
the two other types of Being that Heidegger presents in Being and Time – though these two 
concepts will be explicated in much greater detail later. Entities in the world exist as objects 
ready-to-hand for Dasein. Objects ready-to-hand are not merely present in the world but they 
hold significance for Dasein as objects of equipment, which can be oriented towards tasks. When 
the function of an object ready-to-hand breaks down, the object takes the mode of being as 
present-at-hand. The object becomes estranged from the meaningful structure of equipment and 
is objectively present in the world as an entity among other entities. Vorhandenheit or presence-
at-hand, as we will see, is also the mode of Being that entities are problematically reduced to in 
not only the natural sciences but also in other philosophical accounts of Being.   
To further understand Dasein’s spatiality, we have to first clarify the way in which 
Dasein is ‘being-in-the-world’. Heidegger in fact devotes Chapter III of Being and Time to the 
very task of the thematization of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. While the term ‘being-in-the-
world’ is a unitary term that must be understood in its totality, Heidegger breaks this concept 
down into three parts in order to give a clearer understanding of the term: being-in-the-world can 
be broken down into a understanding of 1) ‘world’ 2) the entities which constitute the very 
‘being’ of being-in-the-world 3) ‘being-in’ as such of being-in-the-world. First, we will start with 
the concept of ‘being-in’ as it elucidates the notion of space Heidegger is arguing against, 
namely that of Descartes’ objective or geometric space. Then we will turn to the notion of the 
world and being-in-the-world in order to grasp Heidegger’s notion of existential space.  
III. SPATIALITY OF ‘BEING-IN’  
‘Being-in’ seems at first glance to be a spatial theme merely by the presence of the word 
‘in’. But in what sense is this concept spatial? The most apparent is to think of it as being-in-
  18 
something as “water” is in a glass or garments are in the cupboard. This sense of Being presents 
a spatial containment, as if space were a vessel in which things could be held, like all the entities 
of the world. This understanding of being-in however presents us with only an objective 
spatiality, which is unable to account for the true nature of the world. Heidegger’s critique of 
Descartes’ understanding of space is helpful in understanding this notion of being-in. For 
Descartes the Being of an entity is ‘substantia’. This itself is problematic because it can either 
imply that Being holds the characteristic of substantiality or is itself a substance. We grasp the 
Being as a substantive entity primarily through its attribute of extension.  All entities are given 
through extension though this attribute can be distributed differently among various objects, i.e. 
shape and size can vary. The spatial understanding of these objects then becomes reduced to a 
mathematical measurement of its length, depth, breath, etc. To understand the world, however, as 
a totality of extended objects entirely misses the phenomenon of the world and the worldly 
characteristics of the objects in the world. The notion of measurability can only suffice to 
account for the spatiality of objects merely present in the world, but all value and practical 
interaction with that object must be suspended to grasp it as merely present.  
Thus, for Heidegger, being-in conceived of as spatial containment pertains only to a 
certain type of Being: “All entities whose Being ‘in’ one another can thus be described have the 
same kind of Being- that of being-present-at-hand [Vorhanden]…We might say that grasping 
things as spatial in this sense…is to grasp those things as ‘objects’ and so as ‘objective’8. The 
sense of being-in brings forth the idea of an objective spatiality because it pertains to entities 
present-at-hand.  
                                                          
8 (BT, 80) 
  19 
Now, let us examine a different way in which ‘Being-in’ can be interpreted. For Dasein, 
Being-in is not a matter of spatial containment. As Heidegger explains through etymology, 
Dasein is in the world in a state of dwelling and familiarity:  
‘In’ is derived from ‘innan’ –‘to reside’, ‘habitre’ , ‘to dwell’ [sich auf halten]. 
‘An’ signifies ‘I am accustomed’, ‘ I am familiar with’, ‘I look after 
something’…’ich bin’ [‘I am’] means in its turn ‘I reside’ or ‘dwell alongside’ the 
world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way
9
 
For Dasein, being-in is understood as Being inhabiting the world rather than being contained in 
it. We inhabit this world in so far as we are familiar with it. This has already been stated in so 
many words in the earlier discussion of the spatiality of equipment. As was stated the spatiality 
of equipment is not reducible to measurement because Dasein interprets the spatiality according 
to its concernful relation to the object. Consider what happens when Heidegger talks about the 
dimensionality of the spatial structure of equipment: “The ‘above’ is what is ‘on the ceiling’; the 
‘below’ is what is ‘on the floor’; the ‘behind’ in what is ‘at the door’; all ‘wheres’ are discovered 
and circumspectively interpreted as we go our ways in everyday dealing; they are not ascertained 
and catalogued by the observational measurements of space”.10 In this case, we see Dasein’s 
familiarity with the world in that dimensions as such are understood for Dasein in a way as 
dictated by its own dwelling in or relation to the world. Dasein’s familiar being-in constitutes the 
totality of equipment as well, so that I am not just in a room with furniture that all references the 
same ‘place’ but rather, I find myself in my living room. Thus far we have understood the 
spatiality of ‘Being-in’ but what we have presupposed thus far is the world of Dasein itself. We 
must now further clarify the world, which Dasein inhabits and the spatiality of the world.  
                                                          
9
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Space as understood, as the spatial containment of entities present-at-hand is ultimately 
an impoverished sense of spatiality for one main reason: it is not the spatiality that belongs to 
Dasein. These entities present-at-hand have no real value in themselves as entities alone, but 
rather only through an encounter along with Dasein: 
“when two things are present-at-hand together alongside on another, we are 
accustomed to express this by saying something like ‘the table stands ‘by’ they 
door or the ‘the chair ‘touches’ the wall’. Taken strictly, ‘touching’ is never what 
we are talking about in such cases… If the chair could touch the wall, this would 
presuppose that the wall is the sort of things ‘for’ which a chair would be 
encouterable…When two entities are present-at-hand within the world, and 
furthermore are worldless in themselves, they can never touch each other nor can 
either of them ‘be’ ‘alongside’ the other…An entity present-at-hand within the 
world can be touched by another entity only if by its very nature the latter entity 
has Being-in as its own kind of Being- only if with its Being-There [Da-sein], 
something like the world is revealed to it.
11
 
Entities present-at-hand as Heidegger suggests are “worldless” meaning they hold no weight as 
entities on their own. Heidegger even harkens to this idea in his initial explanation of different 
sense of the world: “The derivative form ‘worldly’ will then apply terminologically to a kind of 
Being which belongs to Dasein, never to a kind which belongs to entities present-at-hand ‘in’ the 
world”.12 Even if it is a terminological determination, the fact Heidegger assigns this term to 
Dasein still holds weight in understanding Dasein’s relation to entities present-at-hand. It is 
Dasein, through its encounter and relation to the world, which realizes entities present-at-hand 
and constitutes entities ready-to-hand. Therefore, entities present-at-hand have their own 
spatiality, which belongs to them, but in a sense this spatiality remains limited until Dasein itself 
brings a relation to that structure of equipment. We can now see the necessity to understand the 
spatiality of Dasein: spatiality and Dasein are inseparable, and it is only through spatiality of 
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Dasein that we can have a complete understanding of Dasein itself. In turn, Dasein’s relation to 
worldhood is what gives meaning to our lives, more accurately; Dasein’s case in relation to itself 
is what constitutes our worldhood. Thus, to understand the totality of worldhood, including its 
spatial structures, we must understand Dasein and its respective spatiality.  
  
IV. SPATIALITY OF ENTITIES READY-TO-HAND 
At the beginning of Chapter III, which is devoted to uncovering the phenomena of the 
world and worldhood, Heidegger first gives four notions in which we can understand ‘world’. 
First, the world can be conceived of as an ontical concept: the totality of entities present-at-hand. 
Second, world can be considered as an ontological concept: the world as the Being of the totality 
of entities present-at-hand. The third understanding is another ontical concept, but one that is not 
concerned with entities whose Being is not likened to Dasein. Rather, this concept is an 
existential sense of world wherein Dasein dwells. Fourth, there is the world understood as the 
concept of worldhood, a ontologico-existential concept. 
The environment or the surrounding world [Umwelt] is what composes our immediate 
surroundings with which our dealings [Umgang] or interaction is concerned. Our surroundings in 
this sense do not constitute a physical environment as such but rather an existential environment; 
our surrounding is composed of that with which we are engaged and absorbed. The way in which 
we see this environment is through circumspection, which translates into ‘around-sight’. In our 
average everydayness, our dealings take form in a practical way, by our ability to manipulate and 
use objects as some means of production. Entities ready-to-hand in our environment are not just 
things, but rather they are objects invested with practical value. This value, given through 
Dasein’s projection of concern towards the world, constitutes entities as ready-to-hand rather 
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than being understood as present-at-hand. For example, without Dasein’s concern, a hammer 
becomes a piece of wood and steel; it is through Dasein’s concern, in relation to its dealings in 
the world, that constitutes the unity of steel and wood as a hammer. ‘Hammer’, understood as an 
object ready-to-hand, is a tool with which I perform the act of hammering in order to complete 
such and such task. In this sense, the Being of an entity ready-to-hand is inseparable from its 
essential equipmental functionality for Dasein. Objects ready-to-hand are thus most readily 
understood as equipment. The ‘in-order-to’ is another specific characterization of equipment: all 
equipment is structured with an ‘in-order-to’ achieve a task (i.e. a pen is for writing, a broom is 
for sweeping). Moreover, it is not with equipment itself that we direct most of our attention; 
rather it is to the task ‘towards-which’ the equipment is aimed. So, in painting a wall, my 
attention is not directed straightforwardly to the brush as an object in my hand but rather, to the 
paintbrush insofar as it is being used to complete the task of painting the wall.  
All entities ready-to-hand within my environment are not salient in my experience at all 
times but rather they remain ready-to-hand for my use. Through my need and concern various 
equipment become salient in my experience, while others remain hidden. Entities ready-to-hand 
compose our most proximate environment or Umwelt, yet this proximity is to be understood in a 
peculiar way; entities ready-to-hand, as along as they are function properly, are hardly noticeable 
at all. Heidegger makes the claim that it is the very nature of entities ready-to-hand to remain 
hidden until they are needed in some way or are malfunctioning. The breakdown of equipment 
brings to our attention the very nature of this structure of equipment, though typically this 
structure remains underneath our explicit awareness. For example, while the doorknob is 
functioning properly, I hardly notice it at all; I simply turn the knob and walk through the door. 
When the doorknob gets jammed however, the doorknob is made more explicit in my 
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experience.  The totality of the structure of equipment is what composes our immediate 
environment. Our dealings within the environment allow us to realization of and relation to these 
entities ready-to-hand.  
Within the worldhood of the world, entities ready-to-hand have a particular spatial 
structure, which is laid out very clearly by Heidegger in §22. Saying that the structure of 
equipment composes our immediate environment already connotes a certain type of spatiality: 
the structure of equipment is what is proximally closest to us through its characteristic Being of 
ready-to-hand. However, this closeness is not a matter of measureable extension such as ‘the pen 
is one foot away from me’. Rather, “what is close this way get established by the circumspection 
of concern”.13 For example, when building a bookshelf what comes close to me to are the planks 
of wood, the nails, and the hammer; other entities, which are not relevant to my concern, find a 
mode of remoteness or distancing. To further understand the concept of closeness of entities 
ready-to-hand, one must draw a distinction between closeness and measureable distance. 
Closeness is an existential spatial relation determined by Dasein’s concern, whereas measureable 
distance is an objective determination, which lacks consideration of an object’s meaningfulness 
for Dasein. The distinction between closeness and measureable distance points to the existential 
spatiality of Dasein that will receive more elaboration later in this chapter.  
In the same way that closeness is not reducible to measureable distance, the location of 
entities ready-to-hand in the world is not determined by spatial location. Each ready-to-hand 
entity has a ‘place’ [Platz] to which it belongs. The notion of place is more compressive than the 
spatial positions because the latter carries with it no sense of the meaningfulness of location 
whereas the former presents the entity ready-to-hand within the totality of the structure of 
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equipment. To understand this simply think of the placement of various entities ready-to-hand 
within a house – there is a meaningful organization to the home. Objects are not randomly 
strewn about but rather everything has a place. This organization becomes most evident when 
something is out of place; to a find a blender in the bath tub would make clear the blender is not 
in the correct location and also that such a proper place for the blender does exist. All equipment 
belongs somewhere, in some place; this belonging-to is an essential part of the Being of entities 
ready-to-hand. 
The determination of places themselves are not a fixed notion, rather they are based upon 
different regions of the world: “Something like region must first be discovered if there is to be 
any possibility of allotting or coming across…”14 Regions [Gegend] are primary to the places 
which are found within them. Hence it is region that makes possible the aforementioned 
belonging-to of equipment, as within a region equipment finds its place. There is the region of 
the kitchen and the region of the bathroom, in which various entities ready-to-hand find their 
place. These regions of ‘bathroom’ and ‘kitchen’ are derived from the projection of Dasein’s 
concern. It is not the case that there is an absolute region, rather regions insofar as Dasein’s 
concern organizes it as such. Furthermore, to speak of different regions in the world is not to 
suggest that equipment finds itself entirely compartmentalized in separate spaces that “has been 
split up into places”.15 Various regions and places are unified under the totality of the structure of 
equipment – which ultimately is the worldhood of the world. Thus, in understanding the 
spatiality of entities ready-to-hand the difference between objective and existential spatiality is 
once again made evident. The concept of closeness, place, and region of entities ready-to-hand 
hardly find themselves involved with any notion of measureable distance or determined spatial 
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position. Rather, the spatiality of entities ready-to-hand is fundamentally based on the richer 
basis of the worldhood of the world. Furthermore, we see that the spatiality of entities ready-to-
hand fundamentally presuppose the spatiality of Dasein itself. It is only through Dasein’s 
concern towards the world that the spatiality of equipment can be thematized and understood. 
Therefore, in the next section we will turn to an analysis of the spatiality of Dasein in hopes that 
it will further clarify Heidegger’s notion of spatiality.  
 
V. SPATIALITY OF DASEIN  
  Now that we have clarified both being-in and being-in-the-world, we can now move onto 
clarifying the spatiality particular to Dasein. As we noted earlier, in so far as Dasein is a being-
in-the-world it has its own spatiality. Now that we understand the sense in which Dasein is a 
being-in-the-world, let us clarify the structure of its own spatiality.  
As we have discussed thus far, Dasein is not a mode of Being which is reducible to 
substance and in turn is not something that finds a place or location in the world as other entities 
do; Dasein finds itself in the world through a familiar engagement with the world. We already 
began to speak of Dasein’s spatiality with the discussion on ‘Being-in’. Dasein has the spatiality 
of being-in insofar as it dwells in the world. Being ‘in’ the world is not characterized by 
containment, as it is for objects present-at-hand, but rather by Dasein’s engagement with the 
world. This world involves not an assortment of entities present-at-hand: it is composed of 
entities ready-to-hand within a meaningful structure of equipment. Thus, we know that Dasein’s 
spatiality of being-in in characterized by a projection of concern towards the structure of 
equipment but there is still more to be said about the particular aspects of engagement, which 
essentially characterize Dasein’s existential spatiality.  
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 Heidegger mentions two essential aspects of Dasein’s spatiality: de-severance and 
directionality.  De-severance is the bringing close of equipment, or making the remoteness of 
equipment disappear. Again, to bring close is not measured by distance but to bring an entity 
within the scope of Dasein’s circumspection of concern. ‘Closeness’ is a notion brought forth 
earlier in the discussion of spatiality of equipment; it was said that entities ready-to-hand 
inherently have a spatial element because it is what is most proximate or close to Dasein in its 
environment. The proximity of equipment in Dasein’s immediate surrounding too was 
determined by concern. Interestingly, Heidegger notes that Dasein has an essential tendency 
towards closeness. This claim can be understood by revisiting the notion of Dasein’s spatiality of 
being-in. Being-in is characterized by Dasein’s projection of concern towards worldhood. Insofar 
as Dasein is concerned with certain equipment, that equipment constitutes the most proximate 
environment of Dasein. Hence, Dasein has an essential tendency towards closeness because 
closeness occurs through concern.   
Since de-severance is related to concern and not a result of measureable extension, what 
is close and what is far in relation to Dasein has nothing to do with distance. Even our seeing and 
hearing are de-serverant and bring close what is measurably farther away. To elucidate this point, 
Heidegger gives an example of walking on the sidewalk. When walking down the street, what is 
measurably closest to you is the sidewalk itself. With every step, the sidewalk is brought so close 
that your shoe is actually touching it. Yet, while walking down the street one hardly thinks of the 
ground beneath their feet. Circumspectively I’m hardly concerned with it at all, unless the 
sidewalk starts to malfunction for instance due to a bump or a crack in which my foot gets 
caught. At the end of the block I see my friend walking towards me. Because of my concern for 
my friend, my environment is reorganized and my friend is then much closer to me than even the 
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sidewalk, which is touching me. My circumspective concern brings my friend close, makes the 
distance between us disappear.  
The measureable distance which becomes reoriented doesn’t have to be the distance of a 
sidewalk, or rather within sight; hearing has the same capacity to bring close through de-
severance. With our modern technology, I can talk to my friend on the other side of the world, a 
distance almost too great to cognize. Yet, when I’m on the phone and hearing their voice, all of a 
sudden they are closer to me than the very receiver pressed up against my ear. As we have said, 
this happens through our circumspective concern but we can also see how the very structure of 
equipment aids in this ‘bringing close’. As long as the telephone is functioning, the telephone 
recedes and becomes unnoticeable. What becomes salient in my experience is the voice of a 
friend, and in turn she is closer it me. Thus, what is ‘close’ to us is not reducible to measurability 
but rather is it is a matter for Dasein to realize, as it is its own possibility.   
Along with de-severance, directionality is another important characteristic of Dasein’s 
spatiality. When something is brought close through de-severance, directionality constitutes “a 
direction towards a region out of which what is de-severed brings itself close, so that one can 
come across it with regards to its place”.16   Directionality can be thought of as an orientation of 
Dasein’s concern; that which makes explicit the region and place of those entities brought close 
through de-severance. For example, Heidegger talks about left and right. Certain entities ready-
to-hand are oriented to the left and right in relation to our “bodily nature”.17 For example, a glove 
is oriented for either your left or right hand. Overall, both de-severance and directionality 
together constitute the spatial structure of Dasein, and on the basis of which the spatiality of 
entities within the world are also revealed.  
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From this discussion of de- severance and directionality another key trait of Dasein’s 
spatiality is clear; the spatiality of Dasein is the most primordial sense of spatiality. It is only on 
the basis of de-severance and directionality that notions of remoteness or closeness of objects can 
be understood: “Only to the extent that entities are revealed for Dasein in their deseveredness 
[Entferntheit], do remotenesses [“Entfernungen”] and distances with regard to other things 
become accessible in entities within-the-world themselves.”18 Furthermore, to consider distance 
as a measurement of space rather than de-severance and directionality conceals the primordial 
spatiality of Being-in as de-severance and directionality are existentiales of ‘Being-in’. It may be 
argued that it is only measureable distance that can reveal the true space of the world. Even if de-
severance were to provide some ‘estimation’ of distance in a measureable sense, it would remain 
imprecise by scientific standards. This does not mean that the spatiality brought through de-
severance is not accurate, rather is has its own “definiteness which is thoroughly intelligible”.19 
As long as Dasein’s Being is an issue for itself, then its own concern will establish a rightful 
spatiality of our own world in which we dwell – the “true world”.20 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, I have tried to show how in Being and Time, Heidegger presents a new 
understanding of spatiality. Being and Time itself was an entirely novel work, which 
reconstituted the methodology of an inquiry into the question of Being. Heidegger’s conception 
of Dasein as its own possibility, as an entity, which can relate to itself and to other entities in a 
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meaningful way, already constitutes an entirely new sense of spatiality because Dasein is itself 
spatial and in turn, inseparable from spatiality.  
Thus, with the development of the conception of Dasein arises along with it a new 
conception of space. A traditional understanding of geometric space characterized by 
measurability and extension is not the space in which Dasein resides. Measureable extension is 
the spatiality of entities present-at-hand. In Dasein’s everyday averageness, however, what we 
encounter are entities ready-to-hand-- things readily available to our manipulation and use. For 
Heidegger, entities ready-to-hand are primary while entities present-to-hand are only made 
present through a malfunctioning in the structure of equipment. Entities ready-to-hand have a 
different spatiality, one of regions and places, but ultimately their spatiality is determined by the 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 SPATIALITY OF THE BODY-SUBJECT IN MERLEAU-PONTY’S 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Phenomenology of Perception (PhP), Maurice Merleau-Ponty aims to provide an 
alternative to philosophical discourse concerning perception; that is to say, Merleau-Ponty’s 
project aims to move away from traditional empiricism and transcendental idealism to 
understanding the world and the human subject via a fundamental phenomenology of perception. 
Merleau-Ponty’s main objectives in PhP are to purport the importance for a return to the pre-
objective world in philosophical thought, which would grant a new understanding of the human 
subject as a body-subject and as being-in-the-world. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, the human subject 
is undeniably tied to the world in a reciprocal and communicative relationship defined through 
the mind and body, together as one entity – the body-subject.  
Though not the central theme in PhP, space comes back again in this work as an 
inextricable aspect of the human subject. Merleau-Ponty uses spatiality and orientation to 
explicate the notion of the human subject as being-in-the-world. The aim of this chapter will be 
to clarify the concept of space as it affects the human subject who lives through a reciprocal 
relationship of the body subject and the perceived world. In what follows, I will first explicate 
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the return to the pre-objective world, as it brings forth the 
concepts of the body-subject and being-in-the-world. Following, I will turn to an analysis of 
spatiality of the perceived world and of one’s own body.  
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II. THE PRE-OBJECTIVE WORLD  
Merleau-Ponty’s return to the pre-objective world arises from discontent with the 
stronghold scientific laws and objective values have on the world. This is to see the world in our 
natural attitude – understanding which is guided and biased by the natural sciences. Adherence to 
the natural attitude is to inadequately equate objective values as experiential values when in fact 
the latter precedes the former. Merleau-Ponty’s deep criticism of a scientific picture of the world 
stems from the work of Edmund Husserl, such as the Crisis of the European Sciences, which 
addresses the incompleteness of a world view classified solely by scientific values and methods. 
There is nothing fallacious about science itself and there is no denying the contributions of 
scientific inquiry to our knowledge. The dilemma can be seen more precisely as this: the 
questions of science arise from our firsthand experience of the world with the goal of clarifying 
this experience. Yet, the truths of science not only purport to clarify our originary experience of 
the world but our idealization of objectivity leads to the negation of our originary experience of 
the world. The problem comes in disregarding and discrediting our firsthand perceptual 
experience of the world as merely subjective and unfruitful, while glorifying an objective and 
scientific picture of the world as complete and absolute.  
Our idealization of science leads us to believe that it presents us with the absolute reality 
of the world upon a unified objective basis of experience. To perceive the world in an objective 
manner requires one to be removed from the world itself, as if peering in from outside the world 
to make objective observations. How is it possible, however, to remove oneself from the world to 
look in from the outside so to speak? Our ‘view’ of the world is always from somewhere within 
the world.  A view from outside the world is ultimately a view from nowhere; it is an abstraction 
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of various views from somewhere.
21
 That is to say, an objective view of the world cannot exist 
independently, nor is it originary; it is based on, or presupposes, our subjective and primal 
experience in the world. A unified objective picture of the world is founded upon an individual 
perspective. This ‘pre-objective’ world is where objective claims stem from, where the meaning 
of objective claims is founded.  
The pre-objective world can be accessed and studied through phenomenological 
reduction. In the present context, a brief characterization of the reduction will have to suffice: it 
requires that the natural attitude, in which we are immersed via a scientific and objective analysis 
of the world, must be suspended. That is to say, the truth indicators of these scientific and 
objective claims must be bracketed; this does not regard the claims as false, rather judgments of 
truth and falsity are suspended all together. For Merleau-Ponty, this pre-objective world is 
primary; it is the basis for the objective worldview presented by the natural sciences. If science 
abstracts from this pre-objective world, then what is need is a return back to the pre-objective 
world in order to obtain a more exhaustive understanding of the world. It is through our relation 
to this pre-objective world that we come to know the world in general. Our experience of pre-
reflective inhabiting of the world is perception in general--this is why perception is primary to 
Merleau-Ponty. If we are to understand our most rudimentary experience of the world, we must 
conduct a phenomenology of perception. Perception, however, is not to be understood in the 
traditional ways of empiricism and intellectualism, rather Merleau-Ponty aims to show a novel 
way of understanding perception, one that is married to the idea of human subjects as body-
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subjects and as being-in-the-world.
22
 To do so, Merleau-Ponty first provides a critique of two 
traditional pillars of thought: empiricism and transcendentalism idealism (or intellectualism). 
The first section of Phenomenology of Perception entitled ‘Introduction: Traditional 
Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena’ is hardly an introduction at all. Rather, in the first 
section Merleau-Ponty aims to show why traditional ideas of perception found within empiricism 
and intellectualism are inadequate. Empiricism is a sense data theorem; it reduces perception to 
causal relations between sense data and sense organs that process the data to create perceptions. 
For example, sight can be explained as the culmination of lights waves interacting with the eyes 
and hearing explained by vibrations in the air playing with the eardrums. Perception then 
becomes a linear one-way causal path, with a clear start and end point; the external world, 
separate from me, impacts me and causes a sensation.
23
 Perception for Merleau-Ponty does not 
follow a causal pathway from the exterior to the interior where the subject is provoked by her 
environment to have a perceptual experience.  
To understand perception as purely causal, we ourselves have to be understood merely as 
objects that are passively affected in a certain structure of causality in the same manner as other 
objects. We are not, however, in the world only as objects. Evident is the influence of 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology on Merleau-Ponty. In his threefold distinction of Being, 
Heidegger exposes the ontological mistake of equating Dasein to an entity present-at-hand. In the 
same manner, Merleau-Ponty shows through his critique of an empiricist notion of perception 
that humans are not objects within the world.  Rather, we are subjects who inhabit the world, that 
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live in an intimate relationship with the world. A relationship which has no clear start and end, 
but one in which the world and the subject work in synthesis to form meaningful experiences. In 
so far as we are active beings in the world, perception is a reciprocal act between the subject and 
the world rather than a product of causality. To reduce our perception to a causal process is to 
deny that our perception is a situated perception; as was mentioned earlier, our view of the world 
is not a view from nowhere. Likewise, our perception is not an abstracted one but always 
provides us with a view from somewhere within the world. Moreover, this world is not one 
comprised of atoms and molecules but of cultural objects, historical traditions, and predicates of 
value.  
Our perception not only shows us the way the world is in an objective sense, but allows 
us to add meaning to the world itself, to make it my world. Precisely as such, the empiricist 
cannot take into account the existential weight and meaning of our world. The sky may look gray 
in the morning, which can be explained by the empiricist by an analysis of clouds, color, etc. But 
how can we explain why the sky looks sad? The empiricist cannot in this sense account for the 
existential value of our perceptual experiences. Our world is not only scientific, but it is 
emotional and aesthetic (among other things) – a culmination of our engagement to and from the 
world. Moreover, our perception of an object reveals more than just the physicality of the object 
in general; it brings to our awareness the horizon of the object as well as its relation to other 
objects. In essence any perception of one object points beyond the object itself to a horizon of 
possibilities of that object and to its place in a unified whole that is the lived world.  
Thus, the empiricist understands the world as a composition of elements, all separate, and 
causally relating to each other to form our experiences and perceptions. For Merleau-Ponty, 
however, the world is a unified whole in which elements are inseparable from each other, 
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because each element is only constituted in its relation to the whole. Again, a parallel can be 
drawn here to Heidegger’s structure of worldhood to Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the 
structure of perception. In Heidegger’s structure of equipment each piece of equipment’s 
meaning is contingent upon the unified structure of signs and references. It is only because 
objects find themselves a part of a meaningful structure – the Worldhood of the world—that we 
can speak of individuated meaning.  
 Furthermore, empiricist notions of perception explicate not what we see, but what we 
ought to see. What we ought to see or perceive then becomes an objective standard, which we 
place on perception.
24
 An objective standard of perception, say a perception of a table, is there to 
help unify human perception, so that we can engage in conversation about the table starting from 
a base perspective.
25
 This notion of a standard, however, causes problems. First, it deems any 
perception not fitting within the standard as perhaps abnormal. Second, it may alter the way we 
reflect on perception so that we may see what we feel we ought to see. Either way, Merleau-
Ponty would argue that an objective notion of perception, paralleling an objective notion of the 
world in general, would take us farther away from each individuated subjective perceptual 
experience of the world, which underlies the unified objectivist picture of the world. 
Intellectualism comes one step closer to understanding perception more adequately in 
that it recognizes the subject as unique from and thus irreducibly different from other objects in 
the world. In intellectualism the subject is not a passive subject that is consumed in the same 
structure of causality as other objects in the world. The subject is an active agent and it is 
recognized that certain structures of the world stem from the subject. However, in intellectualism 
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the subject is not situated in the world; it is a transcendental subject. Transcendental subjectivity 
imposes structure on the world while the situated subject finds and interprets meaning in the 
world. While intellectualism can strengthen the hold of the subject to its world, it soon loses 
sight of the grounding power of the world on the subject. This again results in a view of 
perception that is determined by a linear path, this time form the subject to the world. For 
Merleau-Ponty however, this view is still not adequate as it ignores the concept that we are in 
fact situated beings. Perception is not just an expositional cognitive act, but it involves 
engagement with a situated being – a bodily engagement – in so far as we are incarnate minds 
within the world.  
Intellectualism and empiricism provide two accounts of the human subject; either as a 
universal consciousness which imposes onto the world or as an object alongside other objects in 
with world. Empiricism conceives of the world as independent and external of the mind while 
intellectualism conceives of it as a construct of a universal consciousness. Though these two 
theories seem radically opposed to each other, there is still an identifiable assumption that they 
both share; they both presuppose the world as fixed and determinate.
26
 This is what gives rise to 
the dogmatic clutch of the objectivist attitude on how the world is conceived and hides from us 
the primal structure of the subject and how the subject truly exists in the world.  Both of these 
conceptions of the human subject and the world fail to capture the existential essence of man, as 
one of engagement and reciprocity with the world, rather than only transcendentally imposing 
upon it or being causally affected by it. Perception gives us direct access to a pre-reflective world 
and involves the reciprocal engagement between embodied subject and the world. Heidegger 
purposely chose not to deal with the issue of embodiment of Dasein, where as for Merleau-Ponty 
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we can only speak of perception by accounting for embodiment, as perception is a bodily 
phenomenon through and through.  
The subject for Merleau-Ponty must be distinguished as the body-subject. Perception is 
inextricably tied to the body: Merleau-Ponty asks us to imagine how we would understand the 
world if our eyes were on the sides of our head. We would then have an entirely different 
understanding of the world, as our perception would be entirely different. Our bodies as they are 
define the manner in which we do interact and experience the world. Therefore, the body cannot 
be categorized as an object among others, since it participates directly in our perception and 
understanding of the world. Nor can the subject be disengaged with the world as a transcendental 
subject, since it is through a bodily experience that we gain access to the pre-reflective world. 
Through this communicative relationship between the body-subject and the world, humans are 
being-in-the-world. The body-subject is not in the world in the manner that water is in a glass but 
rather, in so far as we inhabit the world; we engage and interact with the world and both effect 
and are affected by the world.  
III. SPATIALITY OF THE WORLD 
Merleau-Ponty’s critique of empiricism and intellectualism points to an understanding of 
perception characterized by a meaningful engagement with the world. This new understanding of 
how humans engage in the world thus grants a new understanding of spatiality as compared to 
the model provided by empiricism and intellectualism. In the chapter entitled ‘Space’, Merleau-
Ponty’s goal is to explicate the spatial structure of the perceptual world. He shows that both 
empiricism and intellectualism hold inadequate views as they fail to capture the spatiality of the 
world as is experienced by the human subject. He then provides an alternative understanding of 
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space based on experience; one that is anchored in the world while still maintaining a 
determination rooted in subjectivity. In the chapter, Merleau-Ponty turns again to various 
psychological experiments for support.  
First, Merleau-Ponty makes the distinction between spatialized and spatializing space.
27
 
Spatialized (or physical) space characterizes space as externally independent of the mind, either 
as a container for objects or an intrinsic property of objects. The first notion of physical space 
can be understood as an object to container relation; space acts as a container, which holds the 
objects within the world. Merleau-Ponty argues this cannot be the case because “this relationship 
only exists between objects”.28 The same issue is raised in Being and Time; Dasein cannot be 
thought of as in the world the same way water is in a glass. This understanding commits the 
ontological mistake of reducing Dasein to an object present-at-hand. Dasein, and the body-
subject for Merleau-Ponty cannot be purely contained in space because they have a richer 
commitment with the world than objects do.  
Stephen Priest also points out an essential category mistake in conceiving of space as a 
container.  In this understanding of space, space must be a thing itself over and above regular 
physical things. After all, we assume here that only a thing can be a container for objects. Space, 
however, is not a thing and therefore cannot be a container for other things.
29
 Substantiating his 
initial argument, Merleau-Ponty further denies the idea that the object/containment relation could 
be thought of as a logical inclusion of an object in space “like the one existing between the 
individual and the class” because “space is anterior to its alleged parts”.30 Presumably, Merleau-
                                                          
27 (PhP, 244) 
28 (PhP, 283) 
29 (Priest 102) 
30 (PhP 243) 
  39 
Ponty here means that a spatial part, understood as the spatial region of an object, is only 
conceivable after an understanding of space in its entirety since a spatial region is that which is 
carved out of a context of space as a whole.   
A second conception of spatialized space is space as an intrinsic property of an object. If 
space were a property of objects, however, then each distinct object would construct a distinct 
space within and for itself. This seems experientially to not be the case, as we understand objects 
as sharing one unified space. While it is true that objects have their own distinct object oriented 
spatiality, it is not to say they don’t participate in a unified and shared spatiality as well. For 
example, a vase has its own spatiality; it is circular, hollow, wide, etc. Yet it also participates in 
the wider spatial structure of the room, the house, the street, … and the world. Thus, 
understanding space only as a characteristic of an object is not a sufficient understanding of 
space.  
Merleau-Ponty then draws a second category for space: spatializing space (or geometrical 
space). This second category is associated with rationalist and transcendental idealists 
(intellectualists). In this understanding, space acts as the unifying basis of experience and is 
constructed by our own sensibility. Kant, for example, claims that space is an a priori product of 
our sensibility (or intuition). Space then is a purely mental perception, which arranges and 
organizes our world. Kant claims that even arithmetic and geometry are only apprehendable 
though sensibility’s construction of space/time. In this context, Merleau-Ponty speaks of the 
‘pure position’ of geometrical space.31 That is to say it is a position that is abstracted from the 
need for an object to occupy it, as it is a space that is homogenous and isotropic. This is in 
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contrast to physical space, which is understood as particular to an object, or the situation of an 
object.  
Merleau-Ponty does suggest that spatializing space is more encompassing than 
spatialized space because the former grasps the source of space: the subject. Though it is on the 
right path, there are still problems with spatializing space. Geometrical space is constructed upon 
reflection because it is a product of the mind’s intuition. It is upon reflection of space that we 
move from spatialized to spatializing space.
32
 Space as it is understood through an a priori 
reflection does not, however, reveal to us space as we experience it, rather only how we can 
cognize space. So far in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis, we are presented with two conceptions for 
space: the first, which is unreflective and leaves us living in purely measureable spatial relation 
among things and only insofar as we understand ourselves as things as well. The second, a 
homogenous and unified space that also does not present to us our lived situation and but only an 
abstract pure position. 
Merleau-Ponty then asks if these are the only two ways to understand space: 
Is it true that we are faced with the alternative either of perceiving 
things in space, or […] of conceiving space as the indivisible 
system governing the acts of unification performed by a 
constituting mind? Does not experience of space provide basis for 
its unity by means of an entirely different kind of synthesis?
33
  
To present his positive thesis of this ‘different kind of synthesis’ Merleau-Ponty believes that we 
must turn to experience itself. Merleau-Ponty turns to a series of psychological experiments that 
exhibit the peculiar nature of space, in which space “disintegrates and re-forms before our eyes”, 
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in hopes that it might reveal to us the true nature of space.
34
 The first is an experiment conducted 
by Stratton, in which the subject puts on glasses that invert his entire visual world, though tactile 
and auditory stimuli remain unaffected. After the second day, the subject visually adjusts to this 
newly inverted world but his body remains to feel peculiar as if it is upside down. In the 
following few days the subject’s body also becomes adjusted to his new visual world. The use of 
motor actions aids the subject to a faster acclimation to her new visual world. At the end of the 
experiment when the glasses are taken off, the world does not seem inverted again but does 
remain ‘queer’ and motor actions remain reversed.  
Empiricist psychology would provide an explanation for the experiment as follows: In the 
experiment, the subject’s visual world has been turned upside down, while his tactile world 
remains ‘the right way’. Consequently, the subject is left with conflicting sensations from his 
perceptual field. The subject then uses movement to bridge the discord between her visual and 
tactile representations; soon she can associate the inverted visual world with the tactile world, 
which is still familiar, and translate the new visual world accordingly to her tactile world. So for 
example, she becomes aware that the movement once needed to reach to her toes was a 
movement downwards, but now what is needed it a movement upwards.
35
 Once the glasses are 
taken off, the once normal world seems strange to the subject who had just readjusted to the 
‘topsy turviness’ of the visual world provided by the glasses.  
Prima facie, the empiricist explanation seems like a plausible explanation of the 
experiment, however, the mistake of the empiricist explanation is that it relies on a 
presupposition of an absolute orientation of top and bottom; what remains unclear is the way in 
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which such absolute orientation is constituted. The empiricist bases his ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ by the 
placement of the head and feet, as it is given in content of the visual image.
36
 Merleau-Ponty’s 
objection is precisely that no such absolute orientation exists within the landscape of sensations 
itself. The content of the field does not have an inherent orientation of its own,  “‘inverted’ or 
‘upright’, in themselves, obviously have no meaning”.37 It is even not fully explanatory to say 
that the new visual field is ‘upside down’ in relation to the visual field prior to putting on the 
glasses. To say that is to presuppose an absolute orientation of the old field as well. Empiricism 
can only account for what the subject perceives in accordance with pure sensations, but fails to 
give a contextual clarification as to the subject’s orientation: "the objective relationships as 
ordered on the retina through the position of the physical image do not govern our experience of 
'up' and 'down'”.38 The real question the empiricist should be considering in order to understand 
this experiment is, how an object can appear to us as inverted in the first place, and what does 
this mean when it does? The problem with empiricism was the assumption of orientation, when it 
is not yet clear where this orientation stems from. By answering this question, Merleau-Ponty 
wants to reveal to us the nature of space, a nature that both empiricist and also intellectualist 
accounts of space have yet to capture.  
Merleau-Ponty argues in the case of intellectualism that its notion of space cannot 
account for an inverted world in the subject’s experience at all. If space is a construction of the 
subject’s sensibility, which is apprehended through reflection, how then could the subject ever 
come to feel disoriented in the first place? There would be nothing, Merleau-Ponty claims, which 
enables the constituting mind to distinguish between the spatial arrangement prior and after to 
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putting on the glasses. An intellectualist account of space finds itself stuck within a purely 
subjective scope that it cannot stand outside of, and in turn cannot provide an accurate account of 
space as it is experienced.
39
 Furthermore, geometric space as it is characterized as homogenous 
and isotropic, extends out in all directions. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty claims that at any 
moment, it has no direction because it lacks “an actual starting-point, an absolute ‘here’ which 
can gradually confer a significance on all spatial determinations”.40 Merleau-Ponty’s aim in the 
development of his positive thesis can be understood as determining what the ‘starting point’ of 
space is.  
For Merleau-Ponty both accounts of space are inadequate for explaining the subject of 
the experiment’s transition from spatial disorientation to a newly acclimated sense of space.  
There is a third sense of spatiality that must be accounted for; one that accounts for an 'anchor' 
within the world and pays an adherence to appearances, yet acknowledges the role of the body-
subject in the determination of space. Merleau-Ponty wants to show that space is neither purely 
objective nor n intuition of consciousness; there must be a notion of space that can account for 
the consistency of the world as well as our understanding of the world as determined by our 
goals and tasks.  Thus, the ‘wholly new synthesis’, which Merleau-Ponty is after, has not yet 
been reached. To introduce this new conception of space Merleau-Ponty now turns to a different 
experiment by Wertheimer. In the experiment a subject occupies a room that he perceives only 
through a titled mirror; as a result the entire room, including the walls and other things in the 
room, fall obliquely resulting in the entire room appearing slanted. With time, the subject 
becomes adjusted so the room appears vertical again. Unlike the Stratton experiment, the subject 
does not need any motor involvement for his visual world to become vertical.  
                                                          
39 (PhP, 289) 
40 (PhP, 288) 
  44 
What becomes crucial to understanding the significance of the Wertheimer experiment is 
the concept of a ‘spatial level’ – an engagement with our subjective experience of spatial 
organization, as it affects the human subject, in so far as he is being-in-the-world. A spatial level 
is composed of our preferential planes of space that enable our bodies to be towards action or to 
support the possibility of action. In other words, it is “the way that we find ourselves as 
‘anchored’ within an optimal spatial relationship to the environment around us”.41 The spatial 
level does not, however, stem from the body itself; the body as an object cannot be thought of as 
the ultimatum for spatial orientation. Hence, the vertical cannot be thought of—as posited by the 
empiricist explanation—as “the direction represented by the symmetry axis of our body as a 
synergic system”,42 Rather, a spatial level derives from the notion of the body as an open field of 
possible corporeal actions-- the virtual body: the template for our possible actions towards the 
world. In this sense, “my body is wherever there is something to be done”.43  
In the Wertheimer experiment, the subject is first involved with a spatial level of the 
surrounding room (rather than the image of the room presented in the mirror). The surrounding 
room itself contains the subject’s preferential planes of space and that spatial level he inhabits is 
in accordance with the surrounding room. This spatial level provides the subject with stability; in 
so far as the subject engages this spatial level, he finds himself in a room of habituation, one 
where his virtual body can carry out actions—“ such as walking, opening a cupboard, using a 
table, sitting down”.44 The image in the mirror, however, carries with it no such stability; the 
spatial level of the surrounding room in relation to the image in the mirror is what makes the 
visual in the mirror seem tilted, resulting in a room that is uninhabitable and unfamiliar. This 
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understanding seems vulnerable to objection that Merleau-Ponty just raised to the empiricist: 
how can it be the case that the room shown through the mirror is titled because of its relation to 
the room as the surrounding environment? This understanding seems to depend on absolute 
notions of orientation, such as ‘vertical’ or ‘up’ and ‘down’, which Merleau-Ponty said could not 
be determined through the image or content of a landscape. Merleau-Ponty, however, is not 
suggesting that a spatial level provides an absolute orientation. The spatial levels does use 
‘anchorage points’ from the world, to provide a basis for spatiality, but they are not objective 
points that hold any orientation as necessarily true. Rather they are “touchstones for a corporeal 
spatiality that inhabits its surroundings as an arena of potential action”.45 So, for the subject the 
room in the mirror does seem tilted in relation to the surrounding room, but not based on an 
absolute axis, but because the surrounding room is engaged with a spatial level which is 
constituted by the virtual body, and its gearing towards the world.
46
  
For the subject in the experiment, the room seen through the mirror appears tilted not in 
relation to a sense of vertical in its absolute, but only in so far as the sense of vertical 
corresponds with the subject’s habitual engagement with and towards the world.  The habitual 
nature carries with it an essential familiarity with the world, which for the subject in the 
experiment is disrupted by the tilted room. The room shown through the mirror becomes vertical 
because the subject constitutes a new spatial level in accordance with the image of the room 
through the mirror. The image of the room provides the subject with ‘anchoring points’ with 
which the subject can establish cardinal directions.
47
 The new spatial level is constituted on top 
off the old, in turn the image in the mirror becomes for the subject a ‘vertical’ room; it becomes a 
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room in which the subject is once more able to inhabit— a composition of preferential spatial 
planes which support the virtual bodies needs. It is a result of “a certain possession of the world 
by my body, a certain gearing of my body to the world”.48 In both experiments, the virtual body 
acclimates the subject to its 'abnormal' space so that it can inhabit the space. When the room 
becomes vertical, it becomes recognizable again to the subject as an area in which he can live 
and carry out meaningful actions. In a sense the subject is motivated to orient himself by his 
potential actions and involvement with the world. Fundamentally, by uncovering the constitutive 
nature of spatial levels, we can see what Merleau-Ponty feels is the origin of space:  
“Everything throws us back on to the organic relations between 
subject and space, to that gearing of the subject onto his world 
which is the origin of space”49  
Space is not, as we started out refuting, a container, nor an intrinsic property of an object. 
Neither is it a construction of intuition. What Merleau-Ponty wants to ultimately show is that 
space is a pact between the subject and the world, a notion that is only possible on the basis of 
intentionality. The pact is a synthesis between the subject, as an agent who takes purposeful 
actions towards the world, and the world, which offers anchorage points of stability and 
motivates our gearing towards the world. This relation between the world and the subject is what 
gives rise to the origin of space.  
Merleau-Ponty presents a problem to his thesis of spatial levels, which he quickly 
resolves as not a problem at all. As we have seen, each spatial level is founded upon the basis of 
a prior spatial level –each spatial level presupposes an already constituted level. In this sense, 
                                                          
48 (PhP, 291) 
49 (PhP, 293) 
  47 
each spatial level is “already ahead of itself”.50 Though, if a new spatial level is constituted upon 
the former, it leads to an infinite regress of spatial levels where each is explained as stemming 
from another. There is no way of speaking about the origin of a spatial level other than a 
previous spatial level; where does our originary experience of space stem from? For Merleau-
Ponty however, what seems to be an infinite regress of spatial levels is not an irresolvable issue--
he argues the constitutional chain of spatial levels reveals a fundamental characteristic of space 
or the essence of spatiality itself: “It is of the essence of space to be always ‘already 
constituted’”.51 We are not able to find the “level of all levels” or the originally spatial level 
because it is in the essence of space to always already be constituted, it always precedes itself.  
Moreover, as space is constituted as a pact between the subject and the world, this 
essential characteristic of space again points back to an essence of the subject – ‘to be’ is 
synonymous with ‘being –situated’. Merleau-Ponty’s develops his arguments as such: 
“Thus, since every conceivable being is related either directly or 
indirectly to the perceived world, and since the perceived world is 
grasped only in terms of directions, we cannot dissociate being 
from oriented being, and there is no occasion to ‘find a basis for 
space or to ask what is the level of all levels”52  
We cannot dissociate from our orientation as beings because to be is to be situated in the world. 
To be is not to be nowhere, but rather somewhere within the world. This world is also 
inseparable from spatiality, as it gains its significance from our spatial and oriented habituation 
in it. Therefore, it is impossible to extract our selves from space and as this space is always 
already constituted, it is impossible to speak of our original experience of space.  Though we are 
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unable to thematize this original experience of space, it does not entirely escape us. This 
‘primordial level’ is on the horizon of all our present, past, and future perceptions.53  
 Even our original experience of space, however, does need to be founded upon 
something. Its anchorage is not found within the world, since in order for that to be the case an 
anterior level would still presuppose it. Merleau-Ponty argues that our original experience of 
space must be a pact between the world and a pre-personal subject, “in accordance with an 
earlier agreement between x and the world in general”.54 Here Merleau-Ponty turns to a pre-
personal subject who carries a ‘prepersonal tradition’ between a primordial subject and the 
world. The prepersonal subject is not our embodied being as an agent of our subjective choices 
and intentions, but rather a body of ‘anonymous functions’ – a primordial body that captures the 
natural spirit of man abstracted from a subject’s personal gearing toward the world. This is 
anonymity is not present only in our first grasping of the world, but “it endows every subsequent 
perception, of space with its meaning, and it is resumed at every instant”.55 Our initial 
situatedness in the world presents itself in every situation there after. 
IV. SPATIALITY OF THE LIVED BODY  
 Intellectualism and empiricism – the two dominant philosophical traditions – have 
reduced the body to an object, among other things in the world. The body as an object is an 
unengaged entity. Most famously conceived of as such in Descartes thesis of mind and body 
dualism. The mind is responsible for the cognitive and reflective capacities of the human, while 
the body is mere extension in space. The spatiality of the body for Descartes is simply the 
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geometrical measurements used to define the body to other things in space. This system of 
spatiality only works if the body is thought of simply as a corporeal body, one that is an object 
and simply is there in space. In Husserl’s work, which greatly influenced Merleau-Ponty, Husserl 
makes the distinction between the corporeal body [Körper] or the objective body, and the lived 
body [Leib], akin to Merleau-Ponty’s body-subject. The lived body is one that is purposeful; it 
interacts with the world and assigns it meaning. As we saw in the previous section, the body in 
its meaningful relationship with the world constitutes the experiential space of the world itself. In 
the same way, Merleau-Ponty also shows how the body-subject experiences the spatial position 
of its own body: the spatial organization of our body is understood not through objective points, 
rather it is interpreted through our purposeful existence towards the world.  
 The concept of the lived body, rather than the body as an object, brings for itself its own 
sense of spatiality unique to it than that of other objects. So, for Merleau-Ponty we are not next 
to the ashtray, the same way in which the ashtray is next to the lamp: “the outline of my body is a 
frontier which ordinary spatial relations do not cross”.56 While the spatial position of other 
objects may be determined by geometrical measurements, the pretense of objectivity is not 
sufficient to thematize the experiential spatiality of the lived body. I am not beside the ashtray in 
the same way that the ashtray is next to other objects, simply because the ashtray is there for me 
as I relate to it, as I find my purposiveness geared towards it whereas the ashtray does not have 
the same potential for engagement. As will be shown, the spatial orientation of my body towards 
the ashtray is determined through how I, as an embodied subject, grasp and interact with the 
world. 
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The spatial understanding of one’s own body brings forth a unique sense of interior space 
of the body, as parallel to the exterior relations of the body to the external world. Merleau-Ponty 
suggests that the lived body is not a juxtaposition of limbs and organs in space. The body is a 
unified whole rather than an accumulation of parts. The spatial positions of each of the body 
parts envelop each other, rather than being laid out side by side. To elucidate this notion, 
Merleau-Ponty gives the example of a patient with allocheiria.
57
 If it is the case that the patient 
feels the sensations applied to the right hand in the left hand, this shows that the body is not a 
“mosaic of spatial values” but rather, it is a unified whole. Moreover, I have an understanding of 
my body as a unified organ through the ‘body schema’. The body schema is more than just a 
sketch of the kinesthetic possibilities of my body. Nor is it merely a survey of the position of all 
my body parts. For Merleau-Ponty there is another layer of dynamism added to this body 
schema: “my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or possible 
task”.58 The body schema then not only encompasses an outline of my body as such, but my 
body as it is constantly geared towards the world. With an understanding of the dynamic body 
schema it becomes clear that spatiality of the body cannot be reduced to the spatiality of an 
object. An object only has one facet to its being and its experience of its world is determinate at 
best. The body-subject, however, is dynamic; it experiences its world through possibility rather 
than determinacy.  
In trying to understand the spatiality of the body, considering the spatiality of a particular 
position of the body is no longer adequate. What must be sought after is, in Merleau-Ponty’s 
words, a spatiality of situation—essentially, to understand orientation as inseparable from the 
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way we inhabit the world and in particular moments, the tasks we are involved in. To elucidate 
this notion, Merleau-Ponty gives an example: 
If I stand in front of my desk and lean on it with both 
hands, only my hands are stressed and the whole of my 
body trails behind them like the tail of a comet. It is not 
that I am unaware of the whereabouts of my shoulders or 
back, but they are simply swallowed up in the position of 
my hands, and my whole posture can be read so to speak 
in the pressure they exert on the table.
59
  
In this example, the spatiality of the body could be analyzed as the position of each of the 
separate body parts: the hands are on the table, the shoulder blades pressing into the back, the 
legs are with less pressure as they are aided by the hands. For Merleau-Ponty this description 
would not be adequate because it is merely describing the position of the body at various points. 
What it fails to include in its description is the significance of the body’s relation to the table; in 
that particular moment the body is geared towards the table in a perpetual movement, and the 
rest of the body is associated with this gearing towards. The rest of the body does not simply 
exist in juxtaposition to the hands on the table; rather the rest of the body is enveloped into the 
situation of the hands. One could even imply that the body is geared towards the task off the 
hands, of leaning on the table.  
To take another example, if I’m holding a glass of water, the position of my hand is not 
determined by its relation to my arm, the arm’s relation to the shoulders, the shoulders to the 
back, etc. Experientially a person determines the position of her hands as it relates to the glass 
itself, in so far as she is geared towards the task of taking a sip of water. The rest of the body 
seems to cohere to the set task as well, we sense the legs not as separate and distant from the 
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arms but as enveloped in the same task-geared spatial relation. The glass of water acts as an 
‘anchoring point’ for the person onto her world, an object that orients the body towards its task.60 
The way, in which we determine ‘here’ for the body, then is derived from these anchoring points, 
or rather, the tasks we are involved in. Thus my body is spatially determined not by co-ordinates 
of space or determinate positions of external objects. Rather, the body becomes spatially situated 
in so far as it is anchored to a world of meaningful tasks. Bodily space is also personal; in that it 
is determined by the movements and direction a person takes in her own life.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, we have shown that Merleau-Ponty’s conception of spatiality marks a 
shift from Heidegger’s articulation of existential spatiality of Dasein. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes 
the lived-body as the origin of spatiality in contrast to the ‘bodyless’ spatiality of Heidegger. 
Though Heidegger does not ignore the body in his analysis, it is not explicitly discussed. As we 
have seen, for Merleau-Ponty to be in the world equates to a bodily existence.  Thus, for 
Merleau-Ponty spatiality is projected as a bodily spatiality through and through. Through an 
intense critique of empiricism and intellectualism Merleau-Ponty presents a conception of 
spatiality that is grounded both in the body and the body-subject’s essential engagement with the 
world. He shows that both empiricism and intellectualism hold inadequate views as they fail to 
capture the spatiality of the world as experienced by the human subject. An empiricist account of 
orientation presupposes absolute directions in space as pre-established while intellectualism does 
account for the meaningful world in which the body-subject resides. Merleau-Ponty then 
provides an alternative understanding of space, one that is anchored in the world while still 
finding its origins within the body.  
                                                          
60 (PhP, 115) 
  53 
 To expose this relationship between body and world, Merleau-Ponty introduces the 
concept of spatial levels as preferential planes of space that enable our bodies to be towards 
action or to support the possibility of action. Spatial levels allow us an engagement with our 
subjective experience of spatial organization in that our spatial levels shift in order to provide us 
with a inhabitable environment. This environment is one that we are familiar with and one where 
we can carry out our tasks and goals. The body determines these preferential planes of space; the 
environment becomes familiar insofar as the body is able to relate to environment. If not my 
actual body, at least the virtual body as a template for our possible actions towards the world 
must find familiarity within the environment.  
 The body also finds its own particular spatiality within Merleau-Ponty’s work. The body 
has a particular interior spatiality that is unlike the spatiality of other objects. The parts of the 
body envelop each other rather than being laid out side by side. The body is constantly geared 
towards the world and towards my tasks. As such, the spatiality of the body is not determined by 
position but by situation. The body as inseparable from an engagement with the world while 
simultaneously the world is spatiality organized to satisfy the body; the duality is precisely the 
‘different kind of synthesis’ that space provides, which Merleau-Ponty sought to present.  
However in Merleau-Ponty’s schema the question of how spatiality transforms or 
develops Being is not explicitly addressed. Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, in their 
discussion of spatiality alone do not elaborate the temporal dynamics of the interaction between 
spatiality and Being in the world, leaving us with an abstract and static understanding of 
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spatiality.
61
 How does our understanding of spatiality shift as the lived body or Being evolves 
over time? To address this gap in the schemas of both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, we turn in 
the next chapter to the argument of Jan Patočka. 
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relationship is not explored.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 SPATIALITY OF THE BODY-SUBJECT IN THE WRITING OF JAN PATOČKA 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Jan Patočka, a Czech phenomenologist, was a student of Husserl and Heidegger and a 
contemporary of Merleau-Ponty. Patočka’s phenomenology explores themes of the world, the 
self and the body, among other things, which culminates into a philosophy of three essential 
movements of life. The first movement is one of an intuitive orientation; of ‘sinking roots’ into 
our world and finding our self as located somewhere. Then is the continuance of our existence in 
this location; this movement is oriented towards a self-sustenance. The first two are both natural 
movements that aid in the realization of the third movement of freedom – of true self-
understanding. Patočka is speaking of not only the way we exist in the world, but the progression 
or movement that occurs in life. In this sense, his philosophy is not focused on Being but rather 
on becoming – the process of moving through the world to reach a freedom which comes 
through self-understanding.  
 Similar to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Patočka is also writing in response to a 
mechanistic world view, which has permeated and affected our understanding of the world, our 
bodies, and in turn, the spatiality of the world and our own personal spatiality. As Erazim Kohák, 
Patočka’s translator to English, articulates, a mechanistic world view presents two problems: 
“the ‘true-reality’ it depicted was a construct, intrinsically inaccessible to experience, while 
experience was presented in it as mere appearance”.62 Thus, already present is the problematic 
between reality in itself and reality as it is experienced. As we see from Patočka’s writings, there 
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is a relation between experiential and objective: the objective derives from the experiential. In 
the scientific worldview however, objective reality is portrayed as if it were our experiential 
reality. This approach is problematic because the two are not reducible to each other. 
Understanding personal and impersonal being can elucidate this notion. As an impersonal being, 
the object appears in isolation and from a third person perspective. An objectified understanding 
of it does not take into account its affective and relational qualities to other things. Rather, “all its 
impetus, to be sure, aims at grasping being as it is in itself, as a substanvial being, existing 
autonomously, devoid of further relations […] what can be grasped at a distance, as an object”.63 
It is only through our personal experience of these objects, however, that their meaning or 
significance can be grasped. In this sense, Patočka asserts that the impersonal derives from the 
personal. What the mechanistic world view denies in its strive for objectivity is the importance of 
the personal, though the world we live in is a personal one. Moreover, it not only undervalues the 
personal world, but also believes that science can be done from the impersonal perspective alone. 
This cannot be the case, however, because if the impersonal is derived from the personal then the 
former necessarily involves the latter. For Patočka, science, in its pursuit to objectify and 
methodologically analyze the world, presupposes the ‘natural’ world, which is the subject of its 
scrutiny. In other words, the same world which science tries to objectively describe is a world 
that exists prior to scientific descriptions—a pre-objective world as Merleau-Ponty speaks of it. 
What is needed is a re-examination of the natural world, as it is given in experience. 
 Another central problem to Patočka is the notion of the body; this is of crucial 
significance to this Thesis. Patočka shows that in earlier Western philosophy has treated the 
problematic of the body primarily from the third person perspective. The dialogue is never about 
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self-localization or the self-experience of corporeality. Rather the body is always spoken of as a 
objective body, the body of another. Conceiving of the body as a distant object leads to an 
understanding of the body as an impersonal extension in space. The contributions of 
contemporary thinkers have changed the way the body is perceived from the body-object to the 
body-subject. Patočka references Main de Biran as one of the first of these thinkers, as he 
conceives the body as a certain effort that is put forth to the world. The body is no longer thought 
of as an object—an impersonal being “devoid of all autonomy”.64 Rather, the body is introduced 
as an embodied subject—the body is no longer just extension, but rather an effective agent.  
 Most importantly, the body as body-subject brings forth a crucial re-evaluation of the 
spatiality of the body and of the world. The spatiality of the body can no longer be thought of 
only in terms of extension, but as we will see in Patočka, spatiality is produced by an effort that 
is projected towards the world from the body as zero-ground. This may seem to be a repetition of 
points made by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty but there is an important philosophical difference 
between the three thinkers that is critical to the argument of this Thesis. The critical difference is 
that for Patočka, spatiality of the body leads to a primal orientation in the world, only on the 
basis of which is it possible to engage in what he calls the movements of life, or as I would put it 
stages of growth in life.  
This chapter then, will explore the theme of spatiality in Patočka’s writings, primarily from the 
lectures comprised in Body, Community, Language, World and Patočka’s paper ‘The ‘Natural’ 
World and Phenomenology’. First will be an investigation into how the body-subject comes to 
self-localization and orientation in the world. Subsequent will be an explanation of how the 
individual orients himself on earth, rather than the contextual world.  
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II. LIVED SPATIALITY 
From this new understanding of the body, which first arises from Maine de Biran, is an 
implicit need for a new conceptualization of spatiality. Due to this shift in attitude, the body can 
no longer be conceived of as purely an objective entity arbitrarily placed in space; in 
consequence, what is needed is an understanding of spatiality that accounts also for the way we 
exist in the world. With this at the forefront of his inquiry, Patočka’s question then becomes what 
is the personal spatiality of the body and what does it mean to live spatially? One distinction 
Patočka draws between objective space and lived space is that the latter carries with it an 
awareness of being spatial: “the awareness that we are in space, in the contexts of extension, 
assumes a special structure which has nothing in common with objective extension in space”.65 
The body in objective space finds itself not even in a state of indifference in regards to its 
spatiality but rather it is completely oblivious to the fact. With the outlook of objective extension 
the body is merely an object among other objects with no meaningful relation to them. It makes 
no sense to say that I am beside the table in the same way that the table is beside the chair. I have 
a relation to the table: I can touch it and feel it; I have flexibility of distance from the table. The 
chair alongside the table has none of these opportunities. Thus, the body cannot be conceived of 
in the same spatial schema as objects. This of course further justifies the need for a 
reconceptualization of the body as a body-subject, rather than a body-object.  
The characteristic of awareness as essential to lived spatiality is highly reminiscent of 
Heidegger’s analysis of the spatiality: 
 when two things are present-at-hand together alongside one 
another, we are accustomed to express this by saying something 
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like ‘the table stands ‘by’ they door or the ‘the chair ‘touches’ the 
wall’. Taken strictly, ‘touching’ is never what we are talking about 
in such cases… (Heidegger, 51) 
This excerpt exemplifies the non-relational state in which objective entities find themselves. The 
table is alongside the chair but neither is in any meaningful relation to one another, precisely 
because they do not belong to any world as such. For Heidegger, it is Dasein’s concern towards 
them that projects a relational spatiality. Therefore Dasein is alongside the table in a wholly 
different sense than the table is alongside the chair.  
 Although Patočka is dealing with a similar schema to Heidegger, one crucial difference is 
obvious: Heidegger essentially ignores the problematic of the body in his analysis of Dasein. For 
Patočka, it is through our corporeity and only through it that we can exist in a relational spatiality 
and experience self-localization. As Dasein was for Heidegger the core agent in constituting 
spatiality, the body for Patočka acts as a zero ground which produces its location in space. The 
body is an autonomous agent since it, “is a life which is spatial itself and of itself”.66 The body 
for Patočka—similar to Dasein for Heidegger—is understood fundamentally as a self-relation. 
This self-relation is tied inextricably to the subject body, as one of its basic activities is to 
localize itself in the world through corporeity; it determines, “that we are somewhere and where 
we are”.67 The notion of the body producing its location may prima facie seem puzzling, though 
only when the body is considered in a purely objective manner. If the body were only an object 
among other objects, then Patočka’s account of personal space would be rendered nonsensical, 
but precisely because there is an understanding of the body as a body subject can we come to 
understand its unique constitutive nature of personal space.  
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 There is particular importance of the subject body as the localizer of orientation, as 
orientation cannot be determined through a mental or spiritual ‘I’. As Patočka suggests, the 
mental I has the ability for self-reflection, but what else can it grasp but itself? The body is 
needed for orientation because, as we will see in more detail, orientation is determined through a 
dynamic effort, which stems from our body as zero ground. One cannot deny, however, the 
objective body. There is a sense in which we can understand our bodies as merely corporeal 
entities. Though to conceive of the body in such a way misses fundamental existential 
characteristic of the human.  
III.  SPATIALITY OF THE BODY AS CORRELATED TO THE WORLD 
 Thus far, we have talked about the body as a self-relating entity, which is responsible for 
self-localization. What we have presupposed until now, however, is the very world in which the 
body experiences self-localization. Through Patočka’s writings there are two notions of the 
world that are available. First, there is the world as the horizon of horizons, in which we localize 
ourselves through a flow of dynamic effort from the body. There is also the world as an earthly 
substance, which orients us through the constant presence of the ground and sky. Both of these 
notions of the world must be further explored along with the spatial implications they carry.  
 First, let us discuss the notion of the world as the horizon of horizons. A horizon is a 
presentation of what is given, and yet also what is absent. It, “circumscribes all the particulars of 
a given landscape, its visual part, but transcends it”.68 There is the internal and external horizon 
of any given object. Through the internal horizon, what is absent is given as present. I see my 
copy of Body, Community, Language, World on my study table. All I visually see is the front 
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cover but the internal horizon of the book fills in the gaps missing, and what is experientially 
given to me is not only the front cover, but also the back cover and even the pages of text filled 
in between the two. The book also has an external horizon, which acts as a localizing and 
stabling perspective. The book is located on my desk, which is located in my study, my study is 
located in my house, and my house is located in Virginia, and so on and so forth.  
 In the same way that the book has its internal and external horizons, for Patočka, the 
world too is comprised of horizons. Rather, the world is not an object at all, it is conceived of as 
the horizon of all horizons. The various regions of the world are differentiated by the world’s 
internal horizons. The internal horizon provides individuated variety from the unity of the world. 
These partial horizons are not only in reference to objects in the world but also the horizon of 
dreams, imagination, the past and the future, etc.  The internal horizons of the world are the way 
in which the varying perspectives of the world are given to us in a meaningful organization. Yet 
the world as the horizon from which the varying horizons emerge, does bring a unity and 
stability to the world. While our perspective in the world shifts and changes, the horizon of the 
world “remains constant, always here, changeless”.69 By saying unity of the world, one is not 
limited to what is present in actuality but the horizon of the world brings forth what is absent as 
if it were present. Our perspective of the world is never fulfilled only by what is visually present; 
rather the gaps in our visual perspective are filled by the horizon. As Patočka says, “we always 
see a segment but we always fill it into a full circle” (BCLW, 34). Ultimately, the horizon 
necessitates possibility: “A horizon shows that the absent is nonetheless here and can be 
reached”.70 Thus, the absent which is given to me as present within the horizon is not an 
actuality, but rather, a possibility. To think of experience as only half actuality and completed by 
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mere possibility seems to present a shallow sense of experience. A negative view of possibility 
should be discarded however, as for Patočka, humans essentially live in possibilities as if they 
were actuality.  
 To understand this claim further a distinction must be drawn between the immediately 
relevant and what is experienced as the present. Animals, according to Patočka, are concerned 
only with the immediately relevant: the direct context of the present. They are concerned only 
with things as they are affecting them directly. For humans, the now is constituted by the placing 
of direct content into a greater context of experience: 
 humans by the attitudes they assume, are constantly placing 
themselves into situations other than the directly present ones, into 
the past, into the future, with all their quasi-structures—quasi-
present, quasi-past, etc. […] going into imaginary worlds, into the 
world of reading, of thought sequences, […] of duties that place us 
into a special space which is and yet is not
71
  
Essentially, the context in which we exist in the now is a reflection of the same horizonal 
structure of the world. Our present is an unfolding of the variety of horizons of our world. As 
such, we are affected by the present in terms of its direct content but also all the possibilities that 
lay within that context. To put it more forcibly, we live these possibilities as if they were 
actualities. Patočka emphasizes the fact that we live in this horizonal structure without much 
consciousness of it. This shows that this structure is embedded within in us, its who we are and 
how we essentially function.   
IV. SPATIALITY OF THE HORIZONAL WORLD 
 Thus far, we have discussed the horizonal structure of the world and the modes of 
actuality and possibility in which we experience this world.  Now, the focus will turn to the 
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particular spatiality that is necessitated by the understanding of the world we have thus reached. 
For both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty the use of objective spatiality to account for the spatiality 
of Dasein and the body-subject was inadequate because objective spatiality is not able to grasp 
the ontological essence of the Being of man. For both, their conception of space became formed 
on the basis of the subject’s engagement with the world. Likewise for Patočka, space is to be 
understood on the basis of the horizonal structure of the world as just laid out. We will now have 
to turn to understanding this spatiality in more detail.  
  For Patočka, the aforementioned transference of possibilities into actualities of our world 
is characterized by a certain dynamism, or effort; Patočka also speaks of it as a ‘stream of 
centrifugal energy’. We can understand our bodies as the center of this stream. It projects 
outward from the body and towards the world. Thus, “we have turned away from ourselves, we 
have always already transcended ourselves in the direction of the world, of its ever remote 
regions”.72 This energy projects out to the world and the possibilities it holds. In turn, our sense 
of spatiality will be determined by this effort of dynamism. As a result, we are often unaware of 
ourselves in so far as we are concerned with our world. We never live in ourselves, rather we live 
through our dealings with the world. In turning away from ourselves and towards the world, we 
are not losing our sense of subjectivity, rather our turning to the world is a continuation of 
ourselves in so far as we interact with the other: “the fullness of the I, the personal I, is always 
the correlate of a Thou”.73 Another way to understand this is that though there is a turning away 
from the self, our energy projects towards the world in directions subjectivity itself proposes. 
Thus, I turn away from myself but always towards the other; the pathway of this energy reflects 
me back upon my own subjectivity.  
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 Dynamism then can be thought of as projection of effort into the world, directed at a 
particular, whether it be a task, an event, or a possibility. Patočka emphasizes that this energy is 
directed towards things that interest us or that concern us. This of course can be likened to the 
characteristics of Dasein.  Dasein is at issue for itself and projects an element of concern towards 
the world; in turn Dasein’s concern determines the nearness and farness of objects in the world. 
In the same way, Patočka is also presenting concern but through embodiment. This dynamism is 
projected toward our interest but only insofar as it is a dynamism, which finds its stream of 
energy projecting from the axis of the body. Dynamism manifests itself in the fact that we are 
active and moving body-subjects. In turn, our interests affect our movements and posture – and 
ultimately our spatiality through orientation. For example, in writing this paper, the position of 
my hand clutching the pen and my arm as it moves across the paper are in respect to the overall 
task of writing the paper. In driving a car, again my posture and all my movements are directed 
by my primary interest in driving the car. These examples show how dynamism also has a 
motivational character in that our movements are motivated by our effort towards something. As 
Patočka puts it, by understanding dynamism, “we are simply articulating the initiative experience 
in carrying out movements”.74 This is precisely what it means to conceive of the body as zero-
ground of spatiality; it is point zero and thus, remains unpresented in our experience. Dynamism 
then, is that which orients us in our movements; our movement is always oriented towards the 
object of our dynamism.  
 All that is not the center of our efforts recedes in the background. Interestingly as a result, 
my own body also fades into a ‘demi-phenomenon’. In our experiences, though the body is 
present, it does not originally appear to us. What do appear to us are the objects of interest, those 
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towards which my movement (and body) are directed. As we turn away from ourselves in the 
centrifugal stream of energy, we lose a sense of our bodies for the sake of absorption into the aim 
of dynamism. Thus, “We are aware of ourselves as something that is here but is not a 
phenomenon in the true sense of the word, only presenting things to us, causing things to appear 
to us”.75 The body is conceived of here as the ultimate selfless agent: it recedes into the 
background in order to bring forth things for itself as a body-subject. Furthermore, this peculiar 
agency affects the world though it does not present itself among the things it affects.  
 We have seen how dynamism shapes the spatiality of the body and orientation in 
movement. There is a way in which dynamism also has an effect on the spatiality of our external 
space. Only a small passage directly discusses this issue in Body, Community, Language, World 
directly, part of which is available below: 
The primordial dynamism, as we experience it, characterizes the 
spatiality of our physical presence. That becomes apparent in the 
orientation of space around us, our orientation in space as we live 
it, with its up and its down, right and left, forward and back. Up 
and down make sense insofar as the primordial dynamism of our 
corporeal existence represents a certain effort, that our posture is 
an effort of a kind, overcoming resistance, defying gravity; right 
and left are the original symmetry of our active corporeity, of 
hands and feet, the symmetry of our body, of our movements; 
forward and back is the direction of our activity; of the dynamics 
of work, of a force that sees. Our dynamism does not present itself 




Directions of space are categories by which our dynamism can be meaningful and productive in 
external space. Up and down manifest with regard to an effort insofar as our posture overcomes 
resistance or defies gravity. In this instance, what is also present is the affective nature of 
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dynamism that was mentioned earlier; my effort affects the external space as it resists and defies 
it. Left and right are constituted by the symmetry of our body and movement. Forward and 
backward are directions of the movement of our activities. All these words of direction are not 
significant in that they provide an absolute determination of direction of up and down or right 
and left. Rather, they provide pathways that guide the movement of our effortful and affective 
activities. Merleau-Ponty also speaks in regards to directions of space in the same manner. He 
asserts that up and down are not objective and universal values but that they are determined by a 
relative sense of familiarity that is felt by the individual. This familiarity is representative of 
external space transforming into an inhabitable environment, where one feels an at-homemess, as 
it were. In other words, an environment where one is able to complete his tasks and goals. Thus, 
for Merleau-Ponty, and likewise for Patočka, these directional pathways are not pre-determined. 
Rather they are relative to dynamism’s projection into the world.  
 To summarize, dynamism is an essential force from the subject out towards the world. 
Dynamism does not have a physical characteristic but insofar as it has an effective characteristic, 
it also has the characteristic of corporeity – the body, as such. Dynamism is not given as other 
objects are given in the world, rather it manifests itself in the movements and orientations of the 
body. The body situates itself in the world with regard to the effort that is being projected from 
it. The tasks at hand influence the way my body is situated and its spatial relation to other things. 
The spatial perspective of external space is also determined by dynamism in that direction of up 
and down or left and right associate with the possibilities of my corporeity. For example, left and 
right are determined by my body’s symmetry. Ultimately, self-localization in the world— a 
grasp of ones own spatiality and spatial placement— is interwoven with self-relatedness; as the 
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body is essentially self-relatedness, dynamism projects out towards the world, but in its turning 
away from the body, it simultaneously invokes a self-relation through the other.   
 In this regard, a comparison can be drawn to Heidegger, which Patočka himself speaks 
of. For Heidegger, Being [Dasein] is characterized by a self-relatedness, or self-understanding; 
Dasein is an issue for itself and Dasein always finds itself in the world, somewhere. In this sense, 
self-relatedness intrinsically encompasses a self-localization. For Heidegger, Dasein falls into a 
world by which it inescapably objectifies itself, primarily through its relation to the other. The 
significance of Dasein’s existence is a struggle for autonomy from within this fall. For Patočka, 
self-relatedness only comes by a projection of the self towards the world. As we have said, it is 
through the other that self-relatedness, and in turn self-localization occurs: not a liberation from 
the world—for Patočka we are drawn closer to the world. The term agency was mentioned 
earlier in reference to the body. Here we can see that both Heidegger’s and Patočka’s sense of 
self is reliant on a concept of agency. Dasein is in a struggle to articulate its agency within the 
world in order to gain self-understanding. For Patočka, agency is the necessary characteristic the 
body-subject must have in order to project itself towards the world, and yet return to itself 
through its relation to the other.  
V. THE BODY AS GROUNDED ON THE EARTH WORLD 
 Thus far, we have discussed the concept of the world, the horizon of horizons, and how 
we spatially exist in such a world. Central was the concept of the body as zero ground. The body 
is the axis from which dynamism is projected and at the same time the body is what is hidden 
from us in our relation to the world. The spatial perspective of the world is brought forth in 
relation to the body as an active and moving being. For Patočka, however, there is a more 
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primordial way in which we are localized on the earth, rather than the world.
77
 In what follows, 
our primordial localization between the ground and the sky is a notion that will be further 
explored.  
 To begin, consider this passage from Patočka’s paper ‘The “Natural” World and 
Phenomenology’:78 
Thus the oriented posture comes about through the body in the 
subjective sense, the body as agent, but that does not yet mean that 
it is throughout an orientation to the body. The center of reference 
of bodily orientation lies outside the body as my own: every 
orientation is an orientation of our act, of our active, corporeal 
intervention, and that requires a referent.
79
  
In our previous understanding of spatiality, spatiality was determined by our active corporeity.  
We can now see, however, that this spatial determination comes through the fact that we are 
corporeal beings with the potential for movement and activity; this being said, a more primordial 
reference is needed in the orientation of my body, which in fact lies outside of my body. Since all 
the activities are targeted towards the world, there must be a referent to which my bodily 
activities orient themselves because though they emerge from the body as zero-ground they do 
not orient to the body. Essentially what Patočka is saying is that the body does indeed orient 
itself on the basis of a dynamic effort it puts forth to the world. But insofar as this activity 
corresponds with the world as such, there must also be a referent to this orientation, which lies 
outside of the body.  
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 The most primordial referent Patočka speaks of is the earth itself as a constant and 
unmoving substrate.
80
 It is the unmovingness of the earth that is emphasized in its role as the 
most primordial referent of orientation: “The immobility of the earth belongs to the primordial 
orientedness of the world” (NWP, 355). Thus interpreted, the immobility of the earth allows for a 
constant and unchanging ground upon which the actions of the world are possible. At the same 
time, the immobility of the earth makes possible the easy disappearance of the earth when we are 
caught up in the dealings of our world. In turn, the earth, and its role as a primordial referent, is 
easily presupposed in our understanding of the world as the horizon of possibilities. For anyone 
who has experienced an earthquake, they know all too well the life altering feeling that is 
accompanied by experiencing the earth as an unstable ground. All that is presupposed in every 
movement, every action, and ever step we take, comes to startling clarity in the moments of an 
earthquake. Thus, the earth is the cradle upon which rests all the actions and possibilities of the 
world. The very instance of spatial orientation relies on the earth as a referent. As Patočka 
beautifully puts it: “in every arising, every step, every movement the earth is what is 
presupposed, simultaneously energizing and wearying, as well as sustaining and offering rest” 
(NWP, 255).  In terms of spatiality, there is also the essential characteristic of the nearness of the 
earth. Though at times inaccessible, it is often the ground upon which I build by vertical posture 
and execute my movements. The ground is constantly underneath us, though at the same time 
often made inaccessible by either physical constraints or it is simply not at the focus of our 
attention. 
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 The earth as a stable ground, characterized by nearness, is not the only referent for bodily 
orientation. Patočka also speaks of an essentially distant referent for the body – the sky.81 While 
the earth is essentially near and accessible to us by kinesthesis and tactile sensations, the sky is 
intangible: “a referent to which all that is essentially beyond reach belongs”.82 The sky holds a 
unique characteristic of enclosement. It exposes us to the outside, yet limits us and encloses us in 
an interior. On the other hand, it encloses our horizon but does not limit it. It helps to determine 
our ‘where’ in that there are unchanging markings in the sky. One can assume an example would 
be the North Star or other constellations that exist in the night sky.  Interestingly, Patočka says, 
“one can become lost on earth, not in the sky”,83  
 The earth is also a sustaining entity, the sustenance of our lives depend of the generosity 
of the earth and our bodily rhythms are determined in part by the rhythms of the earth. The earth, 
thus, can be conceived of as a force or power. For example, the deep physics of the earth reveals 
its powers of magnetic push and pull. Rivers flow in a natural direction, the atmosphere is pulled 
towards the earth, etc. Even the understanding of the earth as a force speaks of its orientating 
abilities in the same way earth conceived as a referent does. This is because the force and power 
rules over me and which I never escape. The earth as a power determines the way in which I, and 
all other things together move. As Patočka says, even the bird flying in the air or a cloud floating 
in the atmosphere do not escape the powers of the earth. In turn, the earth as a power or force 
affects the spatiality of all beings.  
 The earth and the sky never fully enter into the bounds of our practical dealings in the 
world. Hence, there is a distinction between the earth, as a constant referent of my body and the 
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world, a context of practical actualities and possibilities of my life. For Patočka, the human is 
constantly absorbed in practical dealings in the world and these practical dealings are always 
with purpose, focused on our needs and wants. In turn, we are not aware of the primordial 
orientation we have to the earth because life for us is a goal, the fulfillment of which leads to an 
absorption into the practical. Just as our corporeity too fades into the background in our 
movements within the world, the earth too fades in our earthly orientation in order of us to live 
practical lives. Both corporeity and the world are constantly presupposed, or at least not at the 
forefront of our awareness in everyday life. Yet, it is only through their recession that we may 
exist functionally as spatial beings in the world.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
 For Patočka, the spatiality of one’s own body as well as our spatial perspective of the 
world is both enabled and influenced by the concept of dynamism. There is a stream of effort and 
energy that is projected from the body towards the world, which influences spatial 
determinations. Often we are spatially oriented in the manner that is appropriate for the dynamic 
task at hand. In our orientation towards the task we are turned away from our bodies. The body is 
point zero of the centrifugal stream of energy but is not presented to us, it remains hidden. 
Patočka quotes Merleau-Ponty in his metaphor that the body is the darkness of the cinema 
needed to make the image on the screen visible. Orientation in the world, and in our dealings, 
presupposes a referent to which our activities orient themselves. This primordial referent is the 
constant and unchanging ground of the earth. For Patočka, one should not naïvely dismiss the 
earth as a fundamental aspect of our orientation. There is a difference between the earth and the 
world in that the world is comprised of our practical dealings, while the earth respectfully has its 
autonomy, it has a deeper significance than that of practicality. Into our absorption of 
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practicality, and essentially our state of becoming, the primordial powers of the earth are 
presupposed and fade into the background.  
 Patočka’s understanding of spatiality is primarily centered on his understanding of 
becoming. In both the natural movements of sinking roots and self-sustenance, we see the spatial 
qualifications that have been laid out in this chapter. First, there is the most fundamental 
grasping of location that is at the root of all human activity. One can go no further till there has 
been a sinking of roots into the world. Primordially, we find ourselves located on the earth 
always, as it is the referent to our orientation in all activity. But we also sink roots into our 
contextual world, by which our activities of self-sustenance can be carried out.  The final 
movement, which Patočka speaks of, liberation through self-understanding, is only possible on 
the basis of a self-localization in the world as well because as we have said it is through our 
projection into the world that we come to understand ourselves better. Hence, we see the 
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of space is one that has been discussed since the beginning of the 
philosophical tradition. To an extent, the philosophy of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Patočka, 
can be seen as a continuation of Kant’s efforts. Space, after Kant, is no longer a determinate 
factor of the external world; space is a fundamental intuition of consciousness. As we have seen, 
however, space for the philosophers addressed in the previous chapters is not thought of as 
constitutive of transcendental subjectivity, but rather of a worldly human subject. As a general 
structure in all three philosophers, there is a push away from an understanding of space as 
determinate and absolute to an understating of space that is directly correlated to a human being 
that is involved in the world. For Heidegger this Being is characterized in terms of Dasein while 
for Merleau-Ponty and Patočka Being is a body-subject or embodied subjectivity. Similarities 
and differences can be seen between these three philosophers, though differences can mainly be 
seen as an addition or continuation of a similar lineage of thought. In this conclusion, I will first 
provide a brief synopsis of the major themes addressed in the previous chapters. Then, I will 
return to the problematic of movement to further understand and derive implications from the 
issue of spatiality.  
II.  BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF PREVIOUS CHAPTERS   
In their understanding of space, all three philosophers under analysis deny the 
reducibility of human spatiality to a geometric understanding of space; space as defined by 
determinate points, mainly distinguishable by measurement. With the dominance of the natural 
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sciences there is an urge to measure and define location by positions and points. Our lives must 
be made rational and articulated through a method—by which our understanding of space is 
greatly influenced. This does give science a base starting pointing from which people can be 
involved in discussion, but it also places a veil on the way we understand experience. There is an 
essential difference between the pure measurements of a shape and the way we experience the 
spatiality of that shape.  In the same manner, there is a distinction to be drawn between our 
numeric distance from an object and its salience within our experience.  
Hopefully now turning back to the presented notions of lived space, it is more evident 
why a scientific understanding of space is found to be inadequate.  First, scientific questions and 
truths are derived from our first hand experience of the world. The natural science aims to 
present itself from the third person perspective, but our primary grasp of the world is always 
from the first person perspective. For Merleau-Ponty this is precisely the problematic of the pre-
objective world, our world prior to theorization of it.  Patočka also presents this issue with his 
discussion of the personal and the impersonal; even if natural sciences present their truths from 
the impersonal perspective it must always be understood as an abstraction from the personal. 
Hence, in an effort to be accurate and objective as possible, scientific space presents itself as 
abstracted from lived space rendering it an inadequate understanding of the true nature of 
spatiality. Secondly, the scientific notion of space fails to grasp the existential value of the world. 
As Heidegger’s fundamental ontology shows, the world is not an arbitrary conglomeration of 
substance. The world is my world, one that is full of objects imbued with importance and 
meaning for my life. A scientific notion of spatiality is not able to account for the 
meaningfulness of the objects in my world; moreover it passes over the phenomenon of the 
world entirely. Lived spatiality on the other hand, is inextricably tied to the notion of the world 
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as a meaningful habitat for humans and is able to shed light on this unique relationship between 
humans and their world.  
Hence, in the first chapter we turned to Heidegger whose analysis of Dasein provides a 
fundamental understanding of experiential space. For Heidegger, or better, a return to our pre-
theoretical understanding of space goes hand-in-hand with the articulation of the pre-theoretical 
understanding of Being; a concept he contends has been passed over or presumed as known 
though it still lies within great ambiguity. Heidegger draws a distinction between the Being of an 
object merely present-at-hand in the world—estranged from its existential meaning— and Being 
understood as Dasein, a Being with the possibility of constituting meaning to its environment. 
This distinction between different modes of Being is the first step to showing that geometric 
spatiality is not applicable to the human subject. Dasein does not exist in the world the same way 
that an object present-at-hand does. Dasein relates to itself and holds its own existence as an 
issue for itself. It holds things in the world with concern insofar as it is involved in tasks.  Thus, 
Dasein’s concern impacts the nearness and farness of objects in the world. As I am concerned 
with different aspects of the world, different objects become salient in my experience. My 
concern molds and shifts my experience of the world, including my spatial relation to other 
objects.  
Curiously, Heidegger conducts his fundamental ontology of Being with bringing forth the 
problematic of the body only in passing within the pages of Being and Time. Dasein holds all the 
essential characteristics of a human being but its embodied nature is not given an explicit 
analysis. Therefore in the second chapter we turned to Merleau-Ponty who contributes greatly to 
understanding the spatiality of the body. Merleau-Ponty is driven by a desire to reject both 
empiricism and intellectualism and return to a pre-objective world; a world prior to theorization 
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of it, one that belongs to experience itself. The pre-objective world can only be accessed by the 
body, thus enters the problematic of the body. The body for Merleau-Ponty is not an object, but 
rather it is a lived body. In his seminal work, Phenomenology of Perception, all notions of mind-
body dualism are left behind as the human is conceived of as the body-subject: a pure unity of 
subjectivity and physicality.  
Embodied subjectivity is not a unique characteristic of the human, rather it is an essential 
requirement of subjectivity and the only way it can access the world. It is only because of the 
structure of our bodies that we do experience the world in our unique perspective. Our forward 
facing eyes give us a different perspective from that of a fish whose eyes are on the side of its 
head. Our spine allows us to twist and see behind us, whereas a horse is confined only to forward 
vision.  Furthermore, for Merleau-Ponty the lived body is the origin of space. Subjectivity’s 
existence in the world is not randomly associated with a physical body that it manipulates. 
Rather, the body and subjectivity—the body-subject—is one independent agent within the world.  
Thus, the spatiality of the body is not objectifiable, it is beyond being reducible to mere 
extension in space. The body exists spatially in so far as it relates to its world through the tasks 
and involvement it sets for itself. 
The body-subject also denies an understanding of space as a containment relationship. 
The body isn’t in space the way water is in a glass. Rather the body dwells in or inhabits the 
space of the world. The world and environment are a familiar habitat for the body, orientation 
and directionality become contingent on the body finding itself within a familiar environment.  
In the Wertheimer experiment that Merleau-Ponty discusses in Phenomenology of Perception, 
the subject adjusts to a visually slanted room because he re-appropriates the room in order to 
make it familiar and inhabitable. The body-subject always craves an orientation in which it can 
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function towards its tasks and goals. Thus, understanding the body-subject as one that inhabits 
the world rather than merely placed in it, changes the way we think of the spatiality of the body-
subject in relation to the external world. This spatiality is not absolute in orientation or 
determinate in direction, but again it is contingent upon the body-subject’s gearing towards the 
world.  
 In the third chapter we turned to the lectures of Jan Patočka for whom, similarly to 
Merleau-Ponty, spatiality of the body is determined through the way in which the body involves 
itself in the world. The concept of dynamism in central for Patočka, as an energy projected from 
the human towards the world. Dynamism directs the projection of effort a human places into its 
worldly tasks and goals. The body acts as a zero-point from which this stream of energy is 
projected towards the world. In turn, our orientation is influenced by the tasks that we are 
involved in. For example, in eating my breakfast, the position of my body is centered around and 
towards my plate of food. With our bodies as zero-point, it is also the body that is often missing 
in our orientation. We are rarely aware of our bodies, but rather towards something to which we 
aim. For Patočka, the other is precisely what enables the self to understand itself with greater 
clarity. Its projection towards the world is always to the other. Thus in the body’s projection 
towards the world, it loses itself into the other causing the body it disappear from my immediate 
awareness. 
By the understanding of the human being that is offered, there is a new way of 
understanding space. In all three philosophers we no longer see space as the physical space of the 
surrounding environment. Nor is space reduced to concepts of distance or determinate points of 
direction. This new understanding of space is enabled, however, not only by the conception of 
Dasein or the human as the body-subject, but also by a new re-understanding of the world which 
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the subject inhabits; all three philosophers have an understanding of the horizonal world within 
which humans live, which greatly broadens the scope of spatial orientation. As Patočka speaks 
of, there is a difference between the content of the present and what is immediately relevant to 
us. The human always finds himself in a moment that goes beyond the content of what 
physically surrounds him. Not only do the internal horizons of every object enable possibilities 
that lay beyond what is merely given of the object but the world as the horizon of horizons 
presents an endless possibilities of experience. Moreover, these possibilities are not phantasy; 
rather they are an essential component of the world we live in and how we experience life. We 
live in possibilities as if they were actualities. Walking around campus, my present moment is 
not only comprised of my walk but also the possibility of going to class. When cooking, I’m not 
only concerned with my current actions but am also pre-occupied by the soon to come action of 
eating. This understanding of the world changes our conception of experiential space because it 
points to how our awareness changes as certain elements of our surroundings become salient and 
other recede; it prioritizes our environment.  
The understanding of our world as a horizonal world and of the human being as an active 
agent within that world is the most essential element in pointing towards an experiential 
spatiality. For all three philosophers Being or the body-subject has agency and volition by which 
it commands its life. This agency of Being within the horizonal world is undeniably what 
restricts an understanding of space merely as geometric evaluations or containment. Our agency 
within the horizonal world allows for constant change in our experience of the world. There is, or 
at least can be, a constant shift in what is near and what is far or what is up and what is down. As 
Merleau-Ponty would phrase it, what we are concerned with is the spatiality of situation, not the 
spatiality of position.  
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Thus far, we have discussed the turn away from a determinate understanding of space to 
one that incorporates and molds with the subject. This is not to say, however, that spatiality for 
Being is entirely relative. It is not the case that space is an intuition of the mind imposed on the 
world by the subject, nor that our adapted understanding of space denies the possibility for many 
subjects to inhabit the same space. For all three philosophers spatiality of the subject molds to 
the activity with which the subject is involved, but always in reference to the external world. 
This is most obvious in Patočka when he speaks of the earth and the sky as being the constant 
referents for the body; for the body does not orient itself in relation to itself, but it refers out 
towards the world in which it is involved. The ground is always the cradle upon which we act, 
even if we are at times distanced from it. For example, when on an airplane flying high above the 
clouds, one’s feet still long for the ground.  The ground provides an unchanging consistency into 
which we can sink our roots. For Patočka, spatiality is determined by one’s tasks and 
involvement in the world; one that is determined by the subjects agency. Yet, it is not the body to 
which the subject references its orientation, rather the body references its orientation to the earth.  
For Merleau-Ponty also spatiality of the body is in reference to the world, as is shown 
through the determination of spatial levels. A spatial level derives from the notion of the body as 
an open field of possible corporeal actions—the virtual body: the template for our possible 
actions towards the world. It provides a preferential organization of space that will allow our 
body to participate in its tasks. The goal in establishing a new spatial level is to create an 
environment that is familiar and inhabitable for the subject. To do this however, does not mean 
the subject changes his environment to feel comfortable. It means that he changes his approach 
to the environment, via his bodily spatiality, to regain a sense of familiarity. In fact, the spatial 
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level provides ‘anchorage points’ within the world that allow for a re-orientation of the subject to 
its new environment.  
Heidegger stays far from the problem of relativism with his initial analysis of Dasein. 
Dasein’s spatiality is most forcefully affected by its dealings in the world. Its experience of the 
world changes as its concern is projected into different regions and tasks. The spatiality of 
Dasein, however, does not change solely based on the concern of Dasein: as we have seen 
already, spatiality still is in reference to the world. In Dasein’s case, there exists a large world 
full of equipment both present-at-hand and ready-at-hand, with which Dasein involves itself. The 
equipment of the world is encased within a large system of references; a system that is not 
determined by Dasein alone, but one that exists intersubjectively. Therefore, Dasein’s spatiality 
is not purely its own. It is always tied to the world that it shares with others. Thus, there is an 
integral sense of agency that the subject must have in order to live spatially. Yet, this agency is 
not entirely determinative of spatiality, it merely acts as a liaison between the self and the world 
to which it is tied. The interweaving of both elements allows the human to live in a world in 
which he is spatially orientated towards his actions and at the same time in space that he 
occupies with others. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF MOVEMENT WITHIN SPATIALITY  
Thus far, the analysis on spatiality has been geared towards orientation as distinguished 
by tasks and goals of human life. In my concluding remarks, I would like to turn to the 
problematic of movement. What has been assumed in our analysis of spatiality towards our tasks 
is that the body is involved in a kinesthetic experience of orientation. Spatiality is gearing of the 
body-subject towards its world, and in turn what is involved in every experience of orientation is 
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the body’s mobility. Take Patočka’s example of leaning towards the lecturer as the student is 
engaged in what is being said; even this simple orientation of the body involves a movement 
which orients the body. What then is the relationship between spatiality and movement? More 
specifically, how does movement help us to gain a sense of spatiality of the body? 
A good way to gain a phenomenological understanding of movement in and of itself 
would be to examine dance. How is it that through movement the dancer is oriented in space? At 
first thought it seems sufficient enough to say that within the studio or theatre space, the 
movement of the dance is oriented by the front of the room which is usually distinguished by 
audience seating, or a mirror in the case of a studio. The movement then has distinguished 
directionality coordinating with an absolute fixed direction; ‘front’, ‘forward’, ‘upstage’ all 
become the point of reference to which the movement is geared. The dancers can move to the left 
or to the right, further upstage or downstage within a common reference point for all as the axis 
of orientation. In cases of some contemporary performance art, however, an issue of growing 
exploration is ‘stage space’; exploring these issues re-evaluates what are the place of the 
audience and the place of the performer. In such instances, an absolute point of direction towards 
which the movement is directed is no longer available as the dance becomes more meaningfully 
involved with its surroundings.  
To understand how a sense of orientation arises in movement, we must turn away from 
dance as a performative activity to analyzing the movement alone within dance. For as long as 
we analyze dance as performance, orientation always arises through the task of performance. The 
dancer orients herself, whether in a classroom or performance space, in accordance with the task 
of performing. We must return to the more immediate issue at hand; how is it through movement 
alone that bodily spatiality may be granted? I think Merleau-Ponty presents a key insight into 
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understanding this issue. For Merleau-Ponty the body-subject is an integrated whole; the body is 
not a composite of different body parts at various points in space, rather it is a unity. The spatial 
positions of body parts envelop each other rather than being laid out side by side. Likewise, what 
is essential in dance is moving from an integrated body. A dancer does not swing her arm 
without an integration of her torso and pelvis as well; the dancer’s arms are not moving in 
isolation from the rest of her body but there is sensitivity to the connection of the arms to the rest 
of the body while in motion. To invoke imagery from Merleau-Ponty, the dancer moves her arm 
and the rest of her body follows behind like the tail of a comet. Her arm gives her an 
understanding of the spatiality of her body; and as her arm moves continues to move the comet 
morphs, her spatiality shifts and morphs as well. In modern dance the concept of ‘initiation’ is 
important within many techniques. It is the initiating body part’s movement that determines an 
organic pathway for the rest of the body; it is also from this point of initiating movement that I 
understand where the rest of my body is in space. Sometimes, movements create moments of 
tension within the body, rather than an organic following. There may be two initiating points 
pulling the body in a twist or stretch. But the tension itself creates an awareness of where those 
two initiating points are, like two ends of a clothesline pulled taut, and where everything in 
between is placed.  
Thus, movement brings forth a primordial sense of spatiality of the body; moreover, it is 
just as much a disclosure of the origins of spatiality. These origins are derived from the 
movements of the human body, as it provides a primary self-localization of the body itself. An 
internal self-localization of the body is primary because arguably, there must be an awareness of 
the body prior to an orientedness towards the world. This must be so for Merleau-Ponty as 
spatiality is a bodily phenomenon. Likewise for Patočka the body is zero-ground for orientation 
  83 
in the world. Yet, one cannot deny that even the dancer has a habitual body. Certain movements 
and patterns become familiar and comfortable in the body. The virtual body of the dancer is 
constantly adapting new movement into a scheme of familiar movement to in order to regain a 
familiar spatial understanding of her body. This is exemplified when a dancer is asked to reverse, 
invert, or retrograde a movement pattern she has just been given. The movement, along with the 
body, feels thrown out of familiarity; the movement becomes ‘topsy turvy’ until the dancer is 
able to re-establish a sense of spatiality of the body with the new movement. Soon, the new 
movement becomes just as familiar or habitual as the original movement pattern.  
Returning to the notion of internal self-localization, an interesting insight arises when we 
consider the body as zero-ground of spatiality. The body as a zero-point disappears in the face of 
its tasks. The dynamism of the human is geared towards the tasks to which she aims while the 
body remains hidden from awareness. When considering tasks in our everyday lives, the body-
subject gears his body to the task at hand, consequently the spatiality of the body is determined 
by his tasks. For the dancer, however, the task at hand is movement alone. When the task at hand 
is movement of the body alone, I would argue that it is not possible for the body to disappear, 
rather the body is made more explicit. Hence, movement alone is able to bring forth a primordial 
sense of spatiality of the body as it brings the phenomenon of the body and its spatial 
organization into hyper awareness. In our everyday lives however, this acute orientation to our 
own bodies is diluted as the body becomes geared towards our tasks. Still, one can argue for 
movement as an essential enabler for understanding the spatiality of our bodies. As Merleau-
Ponty asserts, the body-subject provides the very origins of space. The origins remain hidden, 
however, precisely because the body acts as zero-ground for orientation. The phenomenological 
value of dance is that dance brings into the open what for the most part remains concealed; dance 
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makes explicit the body as the origins of space while in most experience this understanding 
remains implicit.  
Through the history of philosophy, the concept of space has been of marginal importance, 
or at least only side notes for most philosophers. In Being and Time there are only a few sections 
devoted to spatiality because for Heidegger, as is for others, the problematic of space is a part of 
a larger philosophical conversation. Yet, it is one of the most important aspects of a rich 
philosophical understanding of human life because it is the most intrinsic and unavoidable aspect 
of humans. To be human is to be located spatially in a world; it is impossible to imagine it 
otherwise. Moreover, as we have seen in Heidegger’s, Merleau-Ponty’s, and Patočka’s schemas, 
the human is an active agent in the world. He is always involved in tasks and activities that are of 
his concern. This is the state of life of man: to be in the world, working towards our tasks—from 
the everyday dealing and chores of life to our eternal struggle for freedom and true self-
understanding. In Patočka’s third and final movement of life – that of self liberation through self 
understanding—what is necessary from the start is a self localization in the world in order to 
carry out tasks and achievements, only through which there can be access to self-understanding. 
Spatiality then becomes a philosophical concept that cannot be overlooked; to brush over it 
would be to jeopardize everything that is a consequence of it. 
 Lastly, the phenomenological understanding of space expressed in these pages is 
something that once realized, is undeniable in our experience. Just as the body disappears in 
order for us to engage in our dealings with the world, the concept of space and our spatial 
relation to the world is one that is hardly at the forefront of our awareness. It is a nuanced 
phenomenological observation that gives us a richer philosophical understanding of human 
experience. 
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